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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite billions spent on scientific experimentation, such as the Large Hadron Collider at
CERN, modem physics remains largely built upon the theoretical basis worked out by Albert Einstein's "thought experiments." It occurs to Appellant that a simple thought experiment, if the
members of this Court wish to engage in it, may do more than any argument that Appellant can
make to elucidate why Appellant's challenge to IDAPA 17.02.08.033 is necessary, not only because of the regulation's constitutional and statutory authority deficits, but as a practical matter
because it fails to provide clear standards for what attorneys fee arrangements are acceptable and
when approval of attorneys fees is required, never mind the "clearly articulated evidentiary standards" that must be used at a hearing. Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138
(1993). Engaging in this experiment will likely shed light on why even the Commission begs for
"guidance" in the conclusion to its brief on appeal:
You are lawyer attempting to decide whether or not to accept a workers compensation
case, how to structure your fee agreement, and whether to limit the scope of your representation and if so how. Referring to the graphic at Appendix LIV, "What Attorney Fee Arrangements Are Allowed In A Workers Compensation Case and When Must You Seek Approval?" and IDAPA 17.02.08.033 what are your options, and when must you seek approval of an attorney fee?
The Respondent Commission's brief relies primarily upon this Court's decision in Rhodes
v. Indus. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 139, 142,868 P.2d 467, 470 (1993), without explicitly addressing
the issues raised by Appellant regarding his First Amendment challenge to IDAP A
17.02.08.033.01 (see Appellant's Opening Briefat p. 11-12,20-22,39) nor the constraint on the
Commission's statutory authority to limit the measure or mode of attorney's fees in view ofLC. §
3-205 (see Appellant's Opening Briefat p. 8-11, 15-17). The precedential import of Rhodes and
the application of the doctrine of stare decisis to its holdings are matters that deserve this Court's
close scrutiny in light of the fact that Rhodes did not consider the statutory authority and constitutional implications ofIdaho Code § 3-205. Furthermore, Rhodes employed the wrong standard of
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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review, and disregarded the constitutional principals announced in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,
864 P.2d 132, (1993). The unfolding realities of the Commission's interpretation and application
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 that superseded the regulation under consideration in Rhodes, the differences between the two, and considerations of judicial policy discussed in Curr, raise serious
questions concerning 1) the applicability of Rhodes to the issues raised in this appeal with respect
to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01,2) whether this Court would decide Rhodes the same today if the
proper legal standard were applied to the identical issues considered in Rhodes, and 3) whether

Rhodes can be read to even address the primary issues raised by this appeal.
Notwithstanding the fact that Appellant raises no challenge to the Commission's exercise
of discretion, the Commission's brief revisits its reasons for concluding that the Claimants' permanent impairment benefits are not "available funds" recovered "primarily or substantially" as a
result of Appellant's efforts. As discussed below, that much was conceded to the attorney's fees
hearings in each of the consolidated cases or thereafter. The Commission's own observations regarding the problems presented by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, its call to this Court for "guidance,"
and the testimony in the record regarding the shifting interpretations by the Commission of what
constitutes "available funds" subject to a "charging lien" 1 demonstrate the need for this appeal and
for this Court's exercise of its exclusive right to regulate the practice oflaw. See, also, table "The

Commission's Directly Conflicting Interpretations ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01" at Appendix LUI.
Furthermore, it is by no means clear when attorneys fees must be approved other than in connection with lump sum agreements, and it is not clear whether non-contingent arrangements are al-

1 Respondent's representation that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 continues to be interpreted as in the past and as its past
regulations, policies and practices have been applied is inaccurate.There is testimony in the record cited infra that the
Commission's present interpretation of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is inconsistent with the interpretation it has been given
in the cases before this Court. For an illustrative example that in the past simply showing that requesting an impairment rating that was ultimately paid without dispute was enough to satisfy the "available funds" and "new money" standards of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, see the correspondence between the Commission staff and Seiniger Law Offices,
PA and the order approving the lump sum agreement included in the Appendix at XXX.
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lowed. See, graphic "What Attorneys Fees Arrangements Are Allowed And When Is Approval Required?" at Appendix LIV.

II. I.e. § 3-205 REMAINS THE ApPROPRIATE BASIS UPON WHICH To DECIDE THIS CASE
The Commission does not tackle directly Appellant's threshold issue, the lack of statutory
authority for its regulation given the plain meaning ofI.C. § 3-205. 2 It is important to reflect
upon the fact that I.C. § 3-205, passed by the Idaho Territory before the adoption ofIdaho's constitution, is the starting place to understand the constitutional rights attendant to practice the profession of law in Idaho. "Rights guaranteed by our constitution are those specifically enumerated
therein or which existed at common law or by statute at the time our constitution was adopted.
Vol. 1 Idaho Constitutional Debates, 230-1, 257;" [Remaining citations omitted.] Craig v. Lane,
60 Idaho 178, 89 P.2d 1008, 1009 (1939). Rights guaranteed by the Idaho constitution are the
rights as there were known in the Idaho Territory at the time Idaho's constitution was written and

2 Interestingly the current attack on the rights of individuals to pay attorneys is in some ways analogous to the laws
against champerty that spurred the passage of statutes such as I.C. § 3-205.

"The English common law and statutes against maintenance and champerty had their origin, if not their necessity,
in a different state of society from that which prevails at the present time. When the doctrine was established, lords
and other large landholders were accustomed to buy up contested claims against each other, or against commoners with whom they were at variance, in order to harass and oppose those in possession. On the other hand,
commoners, by way of self-defense, thinking that they had title to lands, would convey part of their interest to some
powerful lord, in order, through his influence, to secure their pretended right. The want of sufficient written conveyances, and records of titles, and the feudal relation of villein and liege lord, afforded facilities for the combinations
and oppressions which followed this state of things. The power of the nobles became mighty in corrupting the
fountains of justice. To remedy these evils the law against both maintenance and champerty was introduced." It is
held in Courtright v. Burnes, 3 McCrary, 60,13 Fed. 317: "The tendency in the courts of the United States is
strongly in the direction of relaxing the stringency of the doctrine of the common law concerning champerty and
maintenance, so as to permit greater liberty of contracting between attorney and client than was formerly allowed,
and this for the reason that the peculiar condition of society which gave rise to the doctrine has in a great measure
passed away. In some of the states the common-law doctrine is altogether repudiated, and it is held that no such
contract is now invalid unless it contravenes some existing statute of the state. Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289;
Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580; Richardson v. Roland, 40 Conn. 565; Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86; Hoffman v.
Vallejo, 45 Cal. 564; Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 609." Croco v. Oregon Short-Line R. Co., 18 Utah 311,54 P. 985, 987
(1898). See, also, Smits v. Hogan, 35 Wash. 290, 77 P. 390, (1904) "If, however, the doctrine of champerty ever
was in force in this state, then, as far as it relates to the mode of compensation between attorney and client, it
must have been repealed by our statute as found in section 5165, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., which is as follows: The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors shall be left to the agreement. express or implied, of the parties. * * *, There is nothing in the above statute which prevents the making of the contract set out above, but the parties were left to make such contract as to the compensation of the attorney, if they
saw fit to do so."
Smits v. Hogan, 35 Wash. 290, 294,77 P. 390, 391 (1904). (Emphasis supplied.)
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adopted. State v. Nadlman, 63 Idaho 153, 118 P.2d 58, 61 (1941) citing Craig. Courts must be
guided by the overriding public interest in the preservation of the freedom of contract. Marshall v.
Covington, 81 Idaho 199,206,339 P.2d 504,508 (1959); Shakey's Inc. v. Martin, 91 Idaho 758,
765,430 P.2d 504, 511 (1967). With few exceptions, the United States Supreme Court has actively and consistently encouraged an open market, striking down restrictions that inhibit informed
negotiation for legal services. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)
(minimum fee schedules); Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ban on attorney advertising); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm 'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (restrictions on attorney commercial speech). The express language ofI.C. § 3-205 reserving the measure and mode of compensation to the attorney and client is unambiguous, and is clearly in conflict
with any gloss on the Workers Compensation Act granting to the Commission the right to limit the
measure and mode of compensation. Longstanding precedent favors resolution of this case upon
the basis of the correct interpretation of I.e. § 3-205 and the obvious lack of statutory authority for
regulations limiting the measure and mode of compensation between an attorney and his client:
In accordance with the view, early and deeply imbedded in American constitutional law, that
declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional is the gravest and most delicate duty the
Court can be called upon to perform, the Supreme Court has followed a policy of strict necessity in considering constitutional questions. Thus, the Court has developed a group of selfimposed limitations by which it avoids passing upon constitutional issues in cases confessedly
within its jurisdiction. In the classic formulation by Mr. Justice Brandeis, the seventh and last
of these rules is: "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if
a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided. (Citations omitted.)
Supreme Court Interpretation ofStatutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53 Colum. L. Rev.
633 (1953). [Footnotes omitted.]
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 conflicts with Idaho Code § 3-205, notwithstanding the Commission's reading of Rhodes to permit the limitation of attorney's fees to contingent fees on "disputed" benefits giving rise to a "charging lien" under IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a). Rhodes neither
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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considered the conflict between the regulation it considered with Idaho Code § 3-205, nor the conflict between Idaho Code § 3-205 and the Commission's interpretation of its authority under Idaho
Code § 72-803; conflicts that render the provisions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 limiting the measure and mode of compensation as between attorneys and clients beyond the statutory authority of
the Idaho Industrial Commission. Read correctly, Idaho Code § 72-803 is a grant of power to
Idaho Industrial Commission's to "approve" attorneys fees that must be exercised by providing
notice and an opportunity to be heard based upon articulated standards as required by Curro The
regulation in Rhodes, promulgated pursuant to the statutory authority contained in I.C. § 72-508
satisfied due process by providing for notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of attorney's fees, but the standards that it announced conflicted with the rights vouched safe by the federal and Idaho constitutions as articulated Curro Curr teaches that whatever standards the Commission may adopt to satisfy due process, they must be limited or at least not conflict with the
constitutional rights of workers compensation attorneys. By flatly stating that attorney's fees cannot be limited to "new money," Curr implies that such standards are equitable in nature ("reasonableness factors" to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee) as articulated by this Court in its cases and in Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5. So read, there is no
conflict between Idaho Code § 3-205 and Idaho Code § 72-803. The application of the equitable
reasonableness factors announced by this Court and/or the standards which attorneys are already
bound to observe contained in Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5, do not restrain by law the
"measure and mode" of compensation agreed to by the attorney and client. However, as the
Commission interprets its power under Code § 72-803, the simple act of the legislature authorizing
any government agency to approve attorneys fees would permit each agency to promulgate its own
criteria for attorneys fees without regard to this Court's rules and cases regulating the practice of
law in so far as attorney fees are concerned for whatever political ends are deemed expedient, irreAPPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
-5-

spective of whether or not they conflict with important principals articulated by this Court on the
practice of law, access to justice, and availability of counsel. This Court has addressed the importance of this principal unequivocally:
If attorneys are denied fees for work prosecuted on behalf of an injured workman, there would
be a chilling effect upon the ability of an injured party to obtain adequate representation.
Through their insurance companies, employers regularly obtain exceptional and well-qualified
counsel to defend them in such cases. It is imperative that courts foster and protect the ability
of an injured workman to obtain counsel of his choice. We must avoid a policy or a practice
which would discourage [such] representation .... [Citations omitted.]

Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13,684 P.2d 990 (1984).
Requiring the Idaho Industrial Commission to observe the constraints on its exercise of
power imposed by Idaho Code § 3-205 does not diminish its ability to only approve attorney's
fees that are "reasonable." The Commission might well have reached the same results that it
reached in all three cases on appeal under an appropriate regulation in the exercise of its discretion. In regulating the practice oflaw, this Court has adopted I.R.P.C. 1.5 regarding attorney's
fees and has articulated equitable principles to be applied by Idaho's courts and governmental
agencies in approving attorney fee agreements and awarding attorney's fees. The current regulation already references I.R.P.C. 1.5. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(d)(i and ii) already contains presumptions limiting attorney's fees to 25% in a case in which no hearing has been held or 30% in a
case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted. These presumptions do not offend
either Idaho Code § 3-205 or the Idaho or United States constitutions? Because such a regulation
would do no more than apply factors that this Court has already announced are to be applied in
determining the "reasonableness" ofattorney's fees, it would not conflict with this Court's exclusive jurisdiction in regulating the practice of law. Though the results reached by the Commission
in applying such a regulation might well be unfair, they would not be subject to attack on grounds
3 The same cannot be said of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 (d)(iii) limiting compensation paid for total permanent disability to
fifteen percent (15%) of such disability compensation after ten (10) years from the date that such total permanent
disability payments commenced. This section of the regulation directly conflicts with Idaho Code § 3-205.
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of a lack of statutory authority or unconstitutionality.
However, this is a distinction not without a difference, because the Commission presents
itself to this Court in the confused posture of 1) being faced with a regulation that it did not pass
but feels compelled to apply, 2) recognizing the injustice of being unable to compensate attorneys
for "valuable services" provided to workers compensation claimants, and 3) needing to ask this
Court for "guidance" (in essence an advisory opinion) in applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.

III. THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS' INTERPRETATIONS OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 VARY ON
A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, AND CONFLICT WITH THE POSITION THAT THE COMMISSION HAs
TAKEN IN THIS APPEAL
1.

The Commission Applies and Interprets IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 Arbitrarily Depending Upon The Result It Wants To Reach

The Commission's Position In Its Decision In Kulm Below
In discussing the meaning ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a) in the decision in Kulm on appeal,
the Commission supports it interpretation of "available funds" by citing this Court's opinion in
Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685,963 P.2d 368 (1998):
"This testimony is also significant because it supports a conclusion that however the PPI rating
came into existence, the rating and amount of the award were never disputed. According to
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and OLe, "undisputed funds cannot be used to satisfY claims for attorney's fees."
Therefore, the Court's opinion suggests that even if claimant's entitlement to nondisputed
funds arose after the retention of counsel, such funds cannot constitute "available funds" for
purposes of the attorney fee calculation.
RA at 221. In Kulm, the Commission also held that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c contains a further
restriction on attorney's fees by virtue of its definition of "charging lien":
"Importantly, a charging lien can only attach to available funds where it is demonstrated that
the services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of
which the attorney seeks to be paid. (See, IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.)". This is but one of
five requirements that must be satisfied before a charging lien can be said to exist against
"available funds". As important is the fact that these requirements are not in the disjunctive.
Per the language of the regulation, all of these requirements must be satisfied before a charging
lien can be said to exist.
RA at. 222-223. Emphasis supplied. As demonstrated infra, this is not the interpretation that the
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Commission has consistently given to its attorney fee regulation in general, or IDAP A
17.02.08.033.0I.c in particular in every case.
In providing an example of how the Commission contended it would apply this regulation in a
case where an attorney writes a letter requesting an impairment rating for claimant as soon as the
claimant is medically stable, and the doctor issues the impairment rating in response to the attorney's
request, the Commission argues that though the attorney's efforts may be ''primarily responsible for
securing the impairment rating," they would probably not be "sufficient to demonstrate that his
actions "substantially" secured the PPI award" since the claimant "was going to be entitled to
some type of an impairment rating. There was no evidence that surety contested the rating eventually given by the treating physician." AR 222-223. Of course, the difference between being "entitled to some type of an impairment rating" and getting it awarded and paid is all the difference in
the world, as the testimony of Alan Hull implies. See, infra at 35.

The Commission's Position On Appeal
In its Brief on appeal, the Commission takes the position that:
" ... the term "available funds" does encompass those non-disputed benefits, claimant's entitlement to which did not arise until after the retention of counsel. The "available funds" which
are subject to the attorney's charging lien are further constrained by the provisions ofIDAPA
17.02.08.033.0I.c (Appendix, Document #10, p. 2). The attorney must show, inter alia, that his
services operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund from which the attorney seeks
to be paid."

Respondent's Brief, p. 19. Emphasis supplied.
Indeed, in its briefing on appeal, the Commission states: "The net effect of these new regulatory provisions is to continue to ensure that the attorney fees approved in workers' compensation cases can only be taken from funds which the attorney's efforts "directly succeeded in obtaining on (his) client's behalf"

Intervener - Respondent's Brief at 20. Emphasis supplied. The Commission appears to acknowledge that Appellant performed valuable services, but that he is not entitled to be compensated for
those services from the Claimants' PPI benefits because he did not obtain those.
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The Commission Has Ruled Directly Contrary To Its Position On Appeal
Appellant has included in the Appendix to this brief the Commission's unpublished decision in Rodriguez v. SEDS Corporation and State Insurance Fund, I.C. Case No. 2006-503175.
That decision demonstrates the Commission's shifting and arbitrary interpretation and application
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01. In Rodriguez, Claimant's attorney Breck Barton was awarded attorneys fees out of the claimant's permanent partial impairment benefits. Prior to Mr. Barton being
retained, Claimant's claim had been "accepted" by the surety and benefits were being paid. In response to an inquiry from the surety, Rodriguez's surgeon awarded him a 34% whole person rating and the surety began paying benefits amounting to $52,827.50. Over the course of the payment
of the impairment rating Barton took attorneys fees in the amount of $10,341.41 and costs of
$3,000. Barton's "efforts were neither primarily, nor substantially, responsible for securing the
PPI award within the meaning ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii." See, Order on Attorneys Fees at 2,
Appendix LIV. However, Barton, who is fluent in Spanish, met with the surgeon and explained
Rodriguez's continuing medical problems, which apparently led to additional medical therapy,
temporary disability benefits and travel benefits totaling $139,570.94, the majority of which was
paid directly to the medical providers by the surety without dispute. In Rodriguez, the Commission approves payment of attorney's fees from the benefits paid to the claimant on the undisputed
impairment rating, despite the fact that in this Appeal the Commission suggests that the existence
of a "dispute" is required by this Court's decision in Mancilla. The Commission observes:
"These facts set up an interesting conundrum. * * * In short, having provided a valuable service, Counsel is left with no means to be paid. However, closer scrutiny of the provisions of
the applicable regulation reveals that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it was appropriate for Counsel to take a fee against the non-disputed PPI award, in order that Counsel
should obtain compensation for the service he rendered in connection with the prospective
medical care eventually authorized by Surety."
Appendix at LIV. See, also Table "Shifting Sands of Interpretation" at Appendix LIII. The Commission did not seem to be the least deterred by this Court's holding in Mancilla: "According to
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IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and OLe, undisputed funds cannot be used to satisfy claims for attorney
fees." Mancilla 688,371. It is difficult to understand how IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01's definitions
of "available funds" and "charging lien" can be "clearly articulated evidentiary standards" as constitutionally required by Curr, 692, 138, when IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01's definitions of these terms
both permit awarding attorneys fees out of a PPI benefits paid as the result of an impairment rating
awarded without counsel even soliciting an impairment rating in Rodriquez, and prohibit attorneys
fees to be taken from PPI benefits paid as the result of an impairment rating awarded as a result of
a direct solicitation by counsel because the rating was not disputed, as analyzed in the Commission's hypothetical in Kulm, AR 231-232. It is apparent from the decision in Rodriquez that, contrary to the position that it has taken in this appeal, the Commission at its whim arbitrarily interprets IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 to permit it to approve attorney fees taken from funds not "primarily
or substantially" secured by counsel.

2.

The Commission Has Issued Conflicting Decisions Holding In One That
Only Contingent Fee Arrangements Can Result In A Charging Lien,
And Holding In Another That Contingent Agreements Are Prohibited
By The Anti-Assignment Language Of I.C. §72-802

As observed in footnote 8 of Appellant's Opening Brief, a sitting Commissioner has queried in casual conversation whether claims for contingent attorneys fees may be barred by the antiassignment language ofI.C. §72-802. The significance of the question was not fully appreciated
by Appellant at the time that Appellant's Opening Brief was filed, because the Industrial Commission had not yet issued its decision in Oasis Legal Finance v. Guerdon Enterprises, L.L.c. et. aI.,
IC:2007-028248, 1998-038640,2005-506894,2007-024933,2008-017154,2009-017004, January 13,2012, included in this brief at Appendix XI. Curiously, while IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01
essentially limits attorney's fees to a contingent fee on "new money," the Commission held in Oasis that contingency fees are barred by I.C. § 72-802. The urgency of this Court's seriously conAPPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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sidering the Commission's plea for "guidance' is highlighted by this decision. The conflict in the
logic behind Oasis and the objectionable portions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 illustrate the need
for the issuance of an opinion clearly stating that attorneys fees, while legitimately subject to "approval" by the Commission based on a regulation providing due process and adopting the standards relating to reasonableness announced by this Court, are governed by Idaho Code § 3-205
and are outside I.C. § 72-802.
IV. THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 As APPLIED MUST BE STRICKEN
To PROTECT THE CLAIMANT'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Though Appellant has been declared to be the real party in interest in this appeal, he
brought the appeal to assert his past and present clients' rights to hire an attorney to speak for
them under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the correlative section of
the Idaho Constitution, §§ 9 and 10.4 Far more than the attorney's fees are at stake in this case.
Appellant's right to practice a useful profession, recognized as constitutionally protected in Curr,
and the right of his past and future clients, including those whose cases are on appeal here are
what is really at stake, as reflected by the averments contained in record of Claimant Laurel Kulm
set forth below at page 32. Respondent has not addressed this argument. It is clear that if this
Court does reach the constitutional issues presented in this case (given the policy against doing so
in view of the lack of statutory authority for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 in view ofI.C. 3-205), it
should hold that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is unconstitutional because it precludes Appellant's past
and future clients from retaining counsel to assist them in asserting their legal rights in "undis-

4 "When, however, enforcement of a restriction against the litigant prevents a third party from entering into a relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship the third party has a legal entitlement
(typically a constitutional entitlement), third-party standing has been held to exist. See Secretary of State of Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2845-2848, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (professional fundraiser given third-party standing to challenge statute limiting its commission to 25% as violation of clients' First Amendment right to hire him for a higher fee). A restriction upon the fees a lawyer may charge that deprives the lawyer's prospective client of a due process right to obtain legal representation falls squarely within this principle. See Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623-624, n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, n. 3, 105 L.Ed.2d 528
(1989.)."
S Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720-21, 110 S. Ct. 1428, 1432, 108 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1990).

u.
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puted" cases.

United Mine Workers ofAm., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,88 S. Ct.
353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) considered a First Amendment challenge to a complaint brought by
the Illinois State Bar Association and others to enjoin the United Mine Workers of America, District 12, from engaging in certain practices alleged to constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
"The essence of the complaint was that the Union had employed a licensed attorney on a salary
basis to represent any of its members who wished his services to prosecute workmen's compensation claims before the Illinois Industrial Commission." United Mine Workers, 218,354:
We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth4 Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its
members in the assertion of their legal rights. We start with the premise that the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress or grievances are among the most precious of
the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These rights, moreover, are intimately connected both in origin and in purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and
free press. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. (Citations omitted.) The First
Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or
erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed that prohibits free speech,
press, petition, or assembly as such. We have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or
even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis supplied).

United Mine Workers, 221-22, 355-56.
That the States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond question.
See Trainmen, supra, at 6,84 S.Ct. at 1116. But it is equally apparent that broad rules framed
to protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice can in their actual
operation significantly impair the value of associational freedoms. Thus in Button, supra, we
dealt with a plan under which the NAACP not only advised prospective litigants to seek the
assistance of particular attorneys but in many instances actually paid the attorneys itself. We
held that dangers of baseless litigation and conflicting interests between the association and
individual litigants far too speculative to justify the broad remedy invoked by the State, a remedy that would have seriously crippled the efforts of the NAACP to vindicate the rights of its
members in court. (Emphasis supplied).
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United Mine Workers, 222-23,356. 5 Similarly, the argument that denying Workers Compensation
claimants the right to hire counsel except in disputed matters or by the hour in the name of somehow promoting "sure and certain relief' is equally speculative and tenuous. If this Court reaches
Appellant's constitutional challenges, the attorney fee provisions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 must
be struck down insofar as that regulation precludes Workers Compensation claimants such as LaureI Kulm and Appellant from agreeing to representation and compensation with respect to "undisputed" matters, a concept of almost no utility at the time that Ms. Kulm retained Appellant as her
testimony by affidavit referenced below makes clear, since all she and Appellant could do at the
time that she retained him was speculate as to what position the Defendant employer and surety
might take on the myriad issues that arise in a Workers Compensation case.

V. RHODES V. INDUSTRIAL COMM'N
The Commission's brief on appeal, apart from reviewing its reasons for finding that Appellant has not met the applicable standards ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 (determinations that are not
at issue given Appellant's stipulations and concessions here and below), focuses almost entirely
on this Court's decision in Rhodes v. Indust. Comm 'n, supra. 6 Rhodes is divided into two parts,
"Statutory Authority of the Commission" and "Constitutional Issues."
1.

Rhodes Involved a Different Regulation

At the outset, it is important to observe that Rhodes was not the same regulation at issue in
this case. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, the regulation that the Commission applied in this case, was
enacted on July 1, 1994. Respondent's Brief, p. 18. The regulation in Rhodes was adopted in
1992 and the decision in Rhodes was issued on December 3, 1993. Appellant has distinguished
See, also, Bhd. ofR. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1,7,84 S. Ct. 1113, 1117, 12 L.Ed.2d 89
(1964): "A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way
the right of individuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic
public interest."
5

The Commission's discussion of a trilogy of this Court's cases upholding its discretion in applying IDAPA
17.02.08.033.01 is largely irrelevant, since those cases do not raise or address constitutional issues.

6
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the regulation under consideration in Rhodes and IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 in his opening brief.

Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 34-37. "Judicial opinions are authoritative only on the facts on
which they are founded, and general expressions must be considered and construed in the light of
this rule." Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297,306,206 P.2d 528, 533 (1949). Where there is
room for two constructions of a statute, both equally obvious and equally reasonable, the court
must, in deference to the legislature of the state, assume that it did not overlook the provisions of
the constitution and interpret the statutes in a way in which they do not conflict with the constitution. Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 698, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (1986).
Even if this Court should conclude that the distinction between the two regulations drawn
by Appellant is insufficient to distinguish Rhodes from these cases for purposes of analysis, Rho-

des does not resolve challenges made here that were not raised in it, and its reasoning deserves reexamination particularly because Rhodes appears to have applied the wrong legal standard. Just as
some things deserve saying twice, some questions deserve being considered twice, particularly in
light of aspects ofthe record in this case not before the Court in Rhodes.

2.

Separation of Powers

The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct so that each is
able to operate independently.

State v. Moore, 150 Idaho 17,20,244 P.3d 161, 164 (2010) (Quoting Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho
135, 139,804 P.2d 308,312 (1990). Simply put, the rules of this Court and the constitutional
guarantee of the right to practice a useful profession vouched safe in Curl are impacted and curtailed by administrative rules effectively forbidding representation other than in disputed matters.
Appellant respectfully suggests that the best way to contemplate the statutory authority and consti-

"In addition, the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. Jones v. State Bd. Of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493,225 P. 491 (1923)." Curr691, 137.
7
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tutional deficiencies ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is to consider how this Court would view a law
that limited compensation to attorneys for employers and their sureties to "disputed" matters and
to limit attorney's fees to $10 for such matters. This is not simply an exercise in reductio ad absurdum. This is precisely what Rhodes expressly suggests is within the power of any government
agency or the legislature to do without intruding at all on the exclusive province of the judiciary to
control the practice of law, or offending either due process or equal protection. Appellant doubts
that there is one ofthe member of this Court who would vote that such a regulation limiting the
right to counsel of employers and sureties is within the statutory authority ofthe Idaho Industrial
Commission, or the constitutional power ofIdaho's legislature. Similarly, one doubts whether the
majority in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753,
(2010) would find a statute limiting the conservative organization's ability to pay its retained attorneys more than $10 (or any amount for that matter) constitutional notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's cavalier dismissal of the concerns of Plaintiff's lawyers in Triplett and Walters.
Constitutional rights, and certainly the separation of powers, ought not to depend on whose ox is
being gored. Unfortunately, the fallibility of the federal jurisprudence relied upon by Rhodes underscores the wisdom of Justice Brennan's observation that state Court's should not mechanically
apply U.S. Supreme Court decisions to issues involving state constitutional law, and should follow
constitutional decisions by federal courts only if they are found to be logically persuasive and
well-reasoned. See discussion at p. 20 infra.

3.

The "Statutory Authority of the Commission"

Rhodes challenged the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation of the scope of
power conferred by I.C. § 72-803, complaining that the regulation exceeded any reasonable extension of the power to "approve" attorney fees, and unreasonably transgressed separation of powers.
Rhodes 141, 469. Rhodes addresses the issue of separation of powers in a conclusory fashion:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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This Court has ruled that the Commission has original and exclusive jurisdiction over issues
concerning attorney fees in workers' compensation cases. Brannon v. Pike, 112 Idaho 938,
939, 737 P.2d 459, 460 (1987). However, this ruling must be balanced against the principle
that the judicial department of the government is uniquely imbued with the power to regulate
the practice oflaw. Idaho State Bar Assoc. v. Idaho Pub. Util., 102 Idaho 672, 675, 637 P.2d
1168, 1171 (1981). Where the practice oflaw intersects with a social system such as the workers' compensation system, the judicial power does not merge, but remains plenary. Any authority exercised by the other departments of government that affects the practice of law must not
conflict with judicial resolution. The authority granted to the Commission under § 72-803, to
"approve" attorney fees, does not conflict with the judicial penumbra. The regulation under
challenge, promulgated to foster ease, utility, and predictability in the application of I.C. § 72803, in turn does not overstep the legislative bounds of I.C. § 72-803, read in pari materia with
the entire Workers' Compensation Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rhodes 141,469. Rhodes does not elaborate on why the regulation under consideration did not
conflict with judicial resolution. As discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, that regulation differs significantly from the one under consideration in these cases. Appel/ant's Opening Brief, pp.
34-37. Appellant does not argue that regulations that "foster ease, utility, and predictability in the
application of I.e. § 72-803" are beyond the statutory authority of the Commission. However,
regulations that limit the measure and mode of compensation clearly go beyond that and expressly
conflict with I.C. § 3-205' s injunction "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained
by law." The statutory authority of the Commission to implement the regulation under consideration in Rhodes in view ofI.C. § 3-205 was not raised in Rhodes, and therefore it has no precedential value with respect to that argument in this case. Reviewing the statutory authority of the
Commission, Rhodes observed that the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, as stated in
I.C. § 72-201, is to provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families .... ;" and
that I.e. § 72-803 grants the Commission the authority to "approve" claims for attorney fees; that
the Commission has the authority to administer I.C. § 72-803 and to issue regulations necessary to
bring about secure relief for injured workers and their families. Rhodes 141,469. Emphasis in the
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origina1. 8,9 Rhodes gave Brannon and Idaho State Bar Ass'n summary treatment, and the sweep
and invidiousness ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 challenged by this appeal merits further consideration of the principles reaffirmed in both.
In Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672,673-74,637 P.2d
1168, 1169-70 (1981), an administrative rule concerning representation of parties before the Idaho
Public Utilities Commission was challenged on the ground that it would allow for the unauthorized practice of law in violation of I.C. § 3-104. In declaring that this regulation violated the constitutionally-protected separation of powers, this Court reiterated its long standing authority that
the regulation of the practice of law is within the sole province ofthe judiciary:
The practice of law is so intimately connected with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and regulate the practice naturally and logically
belongs to the judicial department of the state government. Under the doctrine of separation of
powers the courts have inherent power to regulate admission to the practice of law, to oversee
Appellant is not sure what to make of the statement in Rhodes that "[a]ny authority exercised by the other
departments of government that affects the practice of law must not conflict with judicial resolution." If determining the
areas in which an attorney may be hired is an aspect of "judicial resolution" then the regulation challenged in this
appeal clearly conflicts with it. For example, it seems unthinkable that a law stating that only individuals with a net
worth of over $100,000 can retain an attorney on an hourly basis to consult with them about matters not yet disputed,
but which may end up in litigation, would not violate the separation of powers doctrine, on the grounds that the
legislature was motivated by a desire to protect those of moderate means from the high cost of legal advice that it
"finds" unnecessary except in those cases where rights have been "disputed." It is even more unthinkable that a law
restricting the right of a corporation to hire in house counsel with the restriction that they only handle "disputes" would
pass constitutional muster. The defect in such a law would not be that it violates equal protection, (though it clearly
would except under a tortured application of the "rational reason" test) but rather would be that the law clearly would
conflict with this Court's exclusive authority to control the practice of law.
8

Though Rhodes cites Brannon v. Pike, 112 Idaho 938, 737 P.2d 459 (1987) for the proposition that "the Commission
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over issues concerning attorney fees in workers' compensation cases," Rhodes
141, 469, the limited issue addressed in Brannon was "whether the Idaho Industrial Commission or the district court
has jurisdiction to hear a claim by a client against his attorney for alleged breach of contract of representation in a
workers' compensation claim." Brannon 938, 459. Brannon's holding is similarly limited:
9

In view of the uniquely broad grant of original and exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation matters given
to the Industrial Commission, and the fact that I.C. § 72-803 confers upon the commission the jurisdiction to resolve claims for attorney fees, we conclude that there exists a legislative intent that jurisdiction over claims by a
client against his attorney arising out of their fee agreement in a workers' compensation case is properly with the
Industrial Commission, and not the district court.

Brannon 940, 461. Contrary to Rhodes citation of Brannon for the proposition that "[t]his Court has ruled that the
Commission has original and exclusive jurisdiction over issues concerning attorney fees in workers' compensation
cases." Brannon did not so rule, and Appellant is not aware of any other case having so held. The overbreadth of the
statement is staggering, since if true it would deprive the judiciary of all jurisdiction relating to any matter involving
attorneys fees, and sweep within the jurisdiction of the IIC even criminal charges relating to attorneys fees. As but one
example of the absurdity of the pronouncement if taken literally, the Idaho Supreme Court would be powerless to
enforce Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 dealing with attorneys fees, since the violation of the rule would clearly
be an "issue concerning attorneys fees in [a] workers' compensation case" over which the Industrial Commission would
have exclusive jurisdiction.
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the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court, and to control and supervise the practice of
law generally, whether in or out of court. It is a prerogative of the judicial department to regulate the practice oflaw. However, the state has a substantial interest in maintaining a competent bar, and the legislature, under the police power, may act to protect the public interest, but
in so doing, it acts in aid of the judiciary and does not supersede or detract from the power of
the courts. (Footnotes omitted.) 7 AmJur.2d, Attorneys at Law, s 2, p. 55-56. [Emphasis provided.]

*

*

*

In Appiication ofKaufinan, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528 (1949), this is ... stated:
From a careful and comprehensive analysis of all the above authorities, which include most
if not all of the authorities cited by respective counsel and which are closely enough in point
to require consideration, the following rules seem to be deducible: First, that the process of
admitting to the bar comprehends fixing standards as to mental and scholastic qualifications
and determining whether the applicant possesses such requirement; second, that the exercise
thereof is a judicial function, inherent in the courts; and third, the legislature may enact valid
laws in aid of such functions and may, if in furtherance thereof, fix minimum requirements,
but in no event, maximum; and may not require the courts to admit on standards other than
as accepted or established by the courts, and that any legislation which attempts to do so is
an invasion of the judicial power and violates the constitutional provisions establishing the
separate branches of government and prohibiting the legislature from invading the jUdiciary.
69 Idaho at 315, 206 P.2d at 539.

Idaho State Bar Ass'n, 675-76, 1171-72. Emphasis supplied. The lesson from Idaho State Bar
Ass'n. is that administrative agencies may constitutionally aid in this Court's regulation of the
practice oflaw by adopting regulations that ensure that attorney's fees are reasonable. It is another matter entirely, however, to pass a regulation that essentially makes it impossible for an attorney to be paid for all manner of legal services that he is implicitly obligated to provide. lO

Rhodes upheld the challenged regulation finding that the authority granted to the Commission under I.C. § 72-803, to "approve" attorney fees, did not conflict with the judicial penumbra
when read in pari materia with the entire Workers Compensation Act. Rhodes 141, 469. Dismissing the argument that I.C. § 72-803 delegated only the power to "approve" attorney fees to the
Commission, and that the subject regulation in Rhodes went beyond that delegated power, Rhodes
10 See, for one example Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 Advisor, Comment 5 "In general, a lawyer is not
expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of
action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under
Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related to the representation." IDAPA
17.02.08.033.01 has other adverse ethical implications discussed infra.
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held:
"It [the subject regulation] is a framework establishing uniform grounds for fee approval. The
language ofLC. § 72-803 contemplates that the Commission will monitor the appropriateness
of fees on behalf of claimants, and therefore the regulation provides a reasonable interpretation
ofthe power vested by I.C. § 72-803. In this case, the operative word in I.C. § 72-803 is "approve.,,4 Rhodes argues that the word "approve" means simply that, to approve. It does not
mean to "regulate." Given the broad empowerment provided by I.C. § 72-508, coupled with
the purpose underlying the Workers' Compensation Act, i.e., to provide "sure and certain relief
for injured workmen and their families," I.C. § 72-201, we cannot agree with Rhodes' contention. The absence of the word "regulate" in I.C. § 72-803, is not legally significant and does
not exact a reading that the legislature intended to confine the Commission's regulatory authority. "The workers' compensation law is to be liberally construed with a view to effect [sic.] its
objects and promote justice." Mayo v. Safeway Stores, 93 Idaho 161, 166,457 P.2d 400, 405
(1969). Accordingly, we hold that the word "approve" is sufficient to establish the proper
delegation of the power to regulate attorney fees.

Rhodes 141-42,469-70. [Footnotes omitted.] The question left unanswered by Rhodes is when

does a regulation duly adopted pursuant to the permissible delegation of the power to regulate attorney's fees become so broad that it constitutes the regulation of the practice oflaw proscribed by
Rhodes and Idaho State Bar Assoc. v. Idaho Pub. Uti!., supra? One would assume that the deter-

mination that a claimant cannot hire an attorney on an hourly basis for advice, counsel, and representation in matters that have not ripened into a frank dispute, undertakings that probably comprise the majority of work done by attorneys, is a matter going to the heart ofthe judiciary's power
to control the practice oflaw.
The only exception to the Separation of Powers Doctrine occurs where the exercise of another branch's power is expressly directed or permitted by the constitution. Estep v. Commissioners ofBoundary County, 122 Idaho 345, 347,834 P.2d 862,864 (1992). Where in the Idaho Con-

stitution is such an expressive directive? Estep dealt with " ... whether a county board of Commissioners has the authority to promulgate policies or issue orders which limit or direct the hiring decis ions of a clerk ofthe district court." Estep 346, 863. How is the attempt of the Commission to
eliminate retaining an attorney other than with respect to disputed matters a lesser infringement of
the province of the Judiciary?
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4.

The Constitutional Issues Section Of Rhodes Deals Primarily With The
Petitioners' Equal Protection Challenge. Rhodes Address The Separation Of Powers Argument Only In A Conclusory Fashion

In upholding the regulation under consideration in Rhodes, the Idaho Supreme Court
stated: "There is a rational relationship between the legitimate legislative purpose to foster sure
and certain relief for injured workers and the attorney fee regulation. The limit imposed by the
regulation furthers the purpose by making the cost of attorneys paid from new money less burdensome." Rhodes 142,470. This statement highlights the fundamental confusion created by Rhodes.
Assuming that the court is speaking simply to the 25% attorney's fees contained in their regulation, the statement in Rhodes may be debatable but it is not illogical. However, if one reads the
statement carefully, it does not speak to the issue of whether or not there is a rational relationship
between limiting attorney's fees to only disputed matters and sure and certain relief for injured
workers. In fact, the Rhodes decision does not discuss what, if any, rational relationship exists
between fostering "sure and certain relief for injured workers" and limitation of attorney's fees to
"new money" even as defined by the former regulation.

5.

Rhodes'Ill-Considered Dicta Should Be Repudiated By This Court

Unfortunately, the Rhodes decision did not confine itself to the regulation it was considering, but improvidently included the dicta that provides the fundamental support for Respondent's
opposition. Rhodes includes dicta which, if this case is not resolved upon a lack of statutory authority, deserve repudiation by this court. The Rhodes court states:
Unless it can be shown that the regulatory scheme makes legal representation entirely unavailable, evidencing the illegitimacy of the scheme, the scheme does not violate the due process
right of a lawyer's prospective client to obtain legal representation.
Rhodes 142-43,470-71. (Relying on dicta from United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S.
715, 724, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 1433, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990)).
Rhodes' observation that only a regulatory scheme that makes legal representation entirely
unavailable offends due process is clearly dictum. "Where [the] question was not properly before
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court for decision, expression of opinion thereon was "obiter dictum." Long v. State Ins. Fund, 60
Idaho 257,90 P.2d 973 (1939). This observation in Rhodes creates the mischief that this appeal
addresses, because the decision fails to adhere to the venerable judicial wisdom offered by Justice
Brandeis. "The Court has frequently called attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress; and has restricted exercise of this function
by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction offederal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies; and that they have no power to give advisory opinions." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley

Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-46, 56 S. Ct. 466, 482, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936). Brandeis lists six rules for
avoiding pitfalls: "The Court (1) will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it; (2) will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied; will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation (3) in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding; (4) ifthere is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of; (5) upon complaint of one who fails to show that
he is injured by its operation; (6) at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits."

Supreme Court Interpretation o/Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53 Colum. L. Rev.
633,651 (1953); See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring opinion).

Rhodes transgresses Brandeis' rules 1,2 and 4.
Having breached these rules, Rhodes relies on a United States Supreme Court decision
which, while presumably controlling with respect to a due process challenge brought under the
U.S. Constitution, is not controlling on a challenge brought under the Idaho Constitution or the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and one which ought not to be persuasive. Triplett involved a challenge to the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 prohibiting attorneys from receiving
fees for representing claimants except as approved by petitioner Department of Labor. Us. Dept.

o/Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 715, 110 S. Ct. 1428, 1429, 108 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1990). Triplett
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relied upon its decision in Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 105 S. Ct.
3180, 87 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1985) as precedent. Walters v. National Assn. ofRadiation Survivors upheld against due process attack a statutory $10 limitation on attorney's fees payable by veterans
seeking disability or death benefits in proceedings before the Veterans' Administration. Id., 473
U.S., at 319, 105 S.Ct., at 3188.
Of course, it is almost always attorneys for David in "David vs. Goliath" battles whose attorney's fees are limited in the name of protecting David by legislation proposed by the supporters
of the Philistines who are concerned for the inability of young boys to afford slingshots. Interestingly, such legislation never seems to be promoted or even supported by the Davids of this world.
Yet, this Court is asked to turn a blind eye to these legislative charades clearly intended to tip the
playing field of the Courts to the advantage of certain categories oflitigants in the name of the "rational basis" test, a standard that as argued by Appellant infra, is not appropriate when issues of
access to counsel are involved. Fortunately, this Court has demonstrated that it is quite able to distinguish between a proffered "rational basis" and an arbitrary justification when circumstances so
require.
What is the most striking about Walters and Triplett is their import when considered in
conjunction with the United States Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers, supra. It
follows from the analysis in Walters and Triplett that while the State of Illinois Bar Association
could not preclude the United Mine Workers from hiring attorneys to represent their members outright, it could have effectively done so simply by limiting their salary to $10. The irony ofthis
observation brings to mind the words of Justice Robert H. Jackson: "We are not final because we
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
The weakness of the reasoning in Walters, Triplett and the confounding of the sound
reasoning of Curr by Rhodes, highlights the wisdom in Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
-22-

exhortation to the states to consider the limitations of federal Constitutional jurisprudence in
considering challenges brought under state constitutions.
But the point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their
citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law--for without it,
the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.

*

*

*

The essential point I am making, of course, is not that the United States Supreme Court is necessarily wrong in its interpretation of the federal Constitution, or that ultimate constitutional
truths invariably come prepackaged in the dissents, including my own, from decisions of the
Court. It is simply that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law. 83 Accordingly,
such decisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges and
the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them. Rather, state court judges, and also
practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they
are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the
policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive
weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489, 491,502 (1977) (Emphasis supplied, Citations omitted).

6.

Rhodes Appears To Have Applied The Wrong Legal Standard

Rhodes applied the least stringent constitutional standard to the petitioners' equal protection challenge.
Because the challenged regulation creates no suspect or invidiously discriminatory classification and entangles no fundamental right, but involves economic and social welfare legislation,
it must be tested under the restrained standard of equal protection review, the familiar rational
basis test.

Rhodes 142,470. 11 Rhodes assaulted logic and equality before the law when it held that an attor-

11 Although this Court has not expressly declared freedom to contract a "fundamental right" it has declared it to be
"fundamental law" and appears to have applied something akin to a "means-focus" test to regulations restricting the
right to practice a profession:

"Courts scrutinize carefully all contracts limiting a man's natural right to follow any trade or profession anywhere he
pleases and in any lawful manner. But it is just as important to protect the enjoyment of an establishment in trade
or profession, which its possessor has built up by his own honest application to everyday duty and the faithful performance of the tasks which every day imposes upon the ordinary man. 159 Minn. at page 299, 199 N.W. at page
11,52 A.L.R. at pages 1358-1359."
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ney fee regulation that limits only claimants and not defendants rights to agree to the measure and
mode of compensation in workers compensation cases, and announced (perhaps for purposes of
"guidance") in dictum that all limitations on attorney's fees do not deny due process "unless it can
be shown that the regulatory scheme makes legal representation entirely unavailable." Rhodes
reached these obviously unjust conclusions because it applied the wrong legal standard in its
analysis. The standard Rhodes should have applied, and that must be applied in this case if the
Court is not satisfied that the lack of statutory authority for the challenged provisions of IDAPA
17.02.08.033.01 renders consideration of constitutional arguments unnecessary, is the "meansfocus" test.
It is enough to say at this juncture that with respect to certain statutes which create obviously

discriminatory classifications this Court will examine the means by which those classifications
are utilized and implemented in light of the asserted legislative purpose .... This new intermediate standard of equal protection review has been described as "means-focus" because it tests
whether the legislative means substantially furthers some specifically identifiable legislative
end.

Jones v. State Bd of Med, 97 Idaho 859, 867, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976). Curr cited Jones in support of its recognition of attorneys' constitutional rights. Curr, 692, 13 8.
The means-focus test as enunciated by this Court in Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97
Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173,53 L.Ed.2d 223
(1977), establishes a standard of review under Idaho's equal protection guarantee, separate,
distinct, and to be applied independently of the standards applied under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Marshall v. Covington, 81 Idaho 199, 205, 339 P.2d 504, 507-08 (1959).

It must be conceded, and this court has stated, that a regulation abridging or restricting the freedom of contract or
regulating the right to engage in any lawful business in a lawful manner must be reasonable and must reasonably
tend to accomplish or promote the protection and welfare of the public. Regulations which are arbitrary or capricious and which unreasonably restrict or interfere with the liberties of the citizen. without accomplishing or promoting a legitimate object of the police power. are invalid violations of the fundamental law. [Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.]
Messerli v. Monarch Memory Gardens, Inc., 88 Idaho 88,96-97,397 P.2d 34, 39 (1964).

Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts.
Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107,110 (1970). Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70,
75,233 P.3d 1,6 (2008).

Freedom of contract is "a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts and is an essential element of the
free enterprise system." Steiner Corp. v. American Dist. Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787,791,683 P.2d 435,439 (1984)
(citing Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107, 110 (1970)).
Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 452, 210 P.3d 552, 560 (2009).
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Sheppardv. State, Dept. ofEmployment, 103 Idaho 501,503-04,650 P.2d 643,645-46 (1982).
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."

Jones, quoting from Reedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254,30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971).
In considering another regulation of the Idaho Industrial Commission, this Court discussed
the means-focus test, though it found the regulation unconstitutional under either test:
In Utilizing either the "rational basis" or the "means-focus" standards of review, I.C. § 721414 fails to pass constitutional muster. First, I.C. § 72-1414 sets forth an arbitrary classification, since it burdens only those firefighters who are members of the FRF and are subject to
involuntarily retirement because of injuries resulting in the award of worker's compensation
benefits. I.C. § 72-1414 classifies both on the basis of involuntary retirement versus voluntary
retirement, and membership in the FRF versus the PERS system. Further, the classification is
arbitrary as between the firefighter injured early in his career, who ultimately receives 100% of
both his worker's compensation and retirement, and the firefighter injured shortly before retirement who suffers the reduction. Under either of the three instances, the classification is arbitrary and unrelated to furthering a specifically identifiable legislative end.

Deonier v. State, Pub. Employee Ret. Ed., 114 Idaho 721, 727, 760 P.2d 1137, 1143 (1988).12
Against the backdrop ofthese cases, Rhodes' cavalier dismissal of the liberty interest of
workers compensation claimants attorneys announced in Curr, and petitioners due process and
equal protection challenges to the regulation at issue demonstrates the need for the application of
the "means-focus" test with respect to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as applied. Assuming that
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 prohibits an attorney for being paid other than with respect to "disputed"
matters, as now contended by the Commission (and, according to the Commission, required by

Mancilla), IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is blatantly arbitrary. Surely this Court must reject the argument that prohibiting a claimant from compensating her attorney for all services, counseling, advice, research, investigation, advocacy, negotiation, and representation other than with respect to
matters that have ripened into a frank "dispute" does not "substantially further" any "specifically

12 But see, Osick v. Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. of Idaho, 122 Idaho 457, 459, 835 P .2d 1268, 1270 (1992): "Our concern
about the precedential authority of Deonier is that because only two members of the Court concurred in both the result
and the rationale stated in the opinion, the rationale is not controlling for other cases, including this one."
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identifiable legislative end." Jones, 867,407. The regulation Rhodes upheld did not address a
"specifically identifiable legislative end" but was upheld because it purportedly served the purpose
of affording the injured worker "sure and certain relief' simply by virtue ofthe fact that claimants
would not have to pay as much in attorneys' fees. The problem with the application ofthe "rational relationship" test in Rhodes, at least as applied to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, is that without
any focus as to the means involved, and the impact of the regulation on the availability of counsel
in matters other than those which are "disputed," all limitations and restrictions on the right of a
claimant to obtain advice, counsel and representation are acceptable without regard to any consideration as to whether or not the attorney's fees claimed are "reasonable."
No one can gainsay the fact that relief under the Workers Compensation Act is more "sure
and certain" if claimants can obtain attorney services at a reasonable cost, but it does not follow
logically that it is more "sure and certain" if the compensation for those services is so low that
counsel cannot be attracted by the claimant. This much was recognized as intuitively obvious by

Curr, if not accepted as a matter of judicial notice. Yet the same point was rejected as speculation
in Rhodes. In any event, while it is rational to assume that a regulation implementing standards of
reasonableness consistent with this Court's announced equitable standards will promote "sure and
certain" relief for claimants, it is not rational to assume that reliefwill be more "sure and certain"
for claimants if they are prohibited from compensating attorneys for services such as counseling,
advising, researching, investigating, advocacy, negotiations with adjusters, discussions regarding
the claimant with physicians, and representation other than with respect to matters that have ripened into a frank "dispute." Such a proposition is absurd on its face, and clearly arbitrary. Consequently, despite the Commission's almost exclusive reliance on Rhodes, it does not rescue
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 from Appellant's equal protection challenge.
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7.

Rhodes Should Not Be Given Stare Decisis Effect

Rhodes Involved A Different Regulation
Stare decisis is not a confining phenomenon but rather a principle of law. When the appli-

cation ofthis principle will not result in justice, it is evident that the doctrine is not properly applicable. Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795,801,473 P.2d 937,943 (1970). Although the Commission
relies primarily on the Rhodes decision to support its present regulation, Rhodes dealt with a similar yet substantially different regulation. For this reason, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply.
In Addition To Rhodes' Application Of The Wrong Constitutional Standard
And The Fact That It Did Not Consider A First Amendment Challenge, Rhodes Failed To Give Stare Decisis Consideration To Curr
As pointed out above, Rhodes applied a "rational reason" test in its analysis as opposed to
the "means focus" test required by this Court's prior cases. Further, Rhodes did not consider the
First Amendment challenges raised on appeal here. Thus, at most Rhodes can be dispositive of
only limited issues even ifthe doctrine of stare decisis is applied. However, Rhodes failed to consider the doctrine of stare decisis as it should have applied to Curro The policy considerations
militating against unnecessarily pitting officers ofthe Court against their Workers Compensation
clients were obviated by the holding in Curro Curr wisely held "Finally, the 'new money' provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72508." Curr 692, 138. This observation in Curr has nothing to do with the procedural infirmities of

the Commission's sua sponte reduction of attorney's fees it also struck down, and which Rhodes
considered remedied. This aspect of Curr 's holding was not discussed in Rhodes. To the extent
that holding in Curr is in conflict with Rhodes, Rhodes should not be given stare decisis effect.
The wisdom of Curr and the Rhodes' disregard of its teachings are made clear simply by
considering the conflict of interest made manifest by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as presently conAPPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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strued by the Commission. If this Court considers Curr and Rhodes to be in conflict, then Rhodes
should fall, for all ofthe reasons urged on this appeal. For the reasons articulated by Appellant in
his opening brief, he believes that the term "new money" was used in the Rhodes' regulation differently than in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 and therefore the doctrine of stare decisis has no application in this appeal.

Rhodes Should Not Be Given Stare Decisis Effect Because IDAPA 17.02.08.033
Creates A Conflict Oflnterest Not Created By The Rhodes' Regulation
The practice of the Commission in sua sponte denying attorney's fees every time that a
Workers Compensation claimant's attorney cannot document that the benefits agreed to be paid in
the lump sum agreement were indeed "disputed," runs directly afoul of the admonitions contained
in Curro "Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the
eyes oftheir clients, thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship." Curr 692,
138.
In most of the cases handled by the Appellant, there is no issue as to whether or not the
Claimant suffered an injury at work. In such cases, Appellant works with the Claimant and representatives of the Defendants, coordinating doctors appointments, ironing out return to work issues,
making sure benefit checks are paid on time, consulting about possible retraining, investigating
issues related to disability, obtaining an impairment rating, and attempting as diplomatically as
possible to cajole adjusters into paying benefits in a timely manner. Part ofthe art of Workers
Compensation practice is to avoid disputes by preparing the client's case and representing the client with tact and diplomacy. However, when, as in these cases, the Commission attempts to require the attorney to prove that benefits were actually disputed as opposed to artfully coaxed from
the Defendants, Claimant's Counsel is now manifestly in a battle with his client for the funds involved. Consider the letter of September 19,2009 sent by Appellant to Ms. Kulm and the Waiver
of Conflict ofInterest that she was asked to sign. Agency Record p. 95-103, at Appendix I.
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Unfortunately, Appellant is forced to conclude that taking the steps reflected in this letter
and the attached waiver may be necessary whenever his office chooses to press a claim for attorney's fees which the Commission has declined to approve on the basis that the funds involved
were not "primarily or substantially" made available as a result of claimant's counsel's representation. A limitation to a percentage of all benefits recovered and lump sum agreements does not
have this effect, but a limitation to "available funds" does have that effect now that the present
Commission is interpreting this to require proof that the right to benefits was in fact disputed. Indeed, IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as presently applied creates an incentive for claimant's counsel to
avoid finesse as a means of coaxing sureties to pay benefits for fear that his success in that regard
will simply undermine his right to attorney's fees, and result in his essentially having to battle his
own client for the right to payment by marshaling facts at an attorney's fees hearing evidencing
the existence of a "dispute" to overcome the Commission's tacit finding that the attorney has no
right to payment. This is a conflict that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized needs to be avoided. 13
However, if it was not, it would appear that Rhodes failed to consider that the "[T]he rule
of stare decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong,
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy continued injustice." Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131
The conflicts and problems created by requiring an attorney to justify a fee by retroactively demonstrating a "dispute"
have been observed by the U.S. Supreme Court: "First, evaluation of the risk of loss creates a potential conflict of interest between an attorney and his client, for in order to increase a fee award, a plaintiffs lawyer must expose all of the
weaknesses and inconsistencies in his client's case, and a defendant's attorney must either concede the strength of
the plaintiffs case in order to keep down the fee award, or "allo[w] the fee to be boosted by the contingency bonus [by]
insisting that the plaintiffs victory was freakish." Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale
L.J. 473, 483 (1981) (Leubsdorf). Second, in order to determine the proper size of the contingency bonus, a court must
retroactively estimate the prevailing party's chances for success from the perspective of the attorney when he first considered filing the suit. Not only is this mathematically difficult to compute, but "once the result is known, it is hard for
judges and lawyers to regain a perspective of ignorance and to treat the result as only one of several that were initially
possible." Id., at 486. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 721-22, 107 S.
Ct. 3078, 3084-85, 97 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1987).
13

"Evaluation of the contingency factor pits lawyers against their clients. To increase his fee, the plaintiffs lawyer must
show that his client had only a slight prospect of success when the case was brought. He will emphasize the barriers
the client faced: ambiguous precedents, conflicting evidence, plausible defenses, and the like. As a result, the merits of
the client's claim will be thrown into question before the judge and opposing counsel." John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale LJ. 473, 482-83 (1981).
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Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho
72, 77, 803 P.2d 978,983 (1990)). Rhodes totally disregarded without comment the portion of
Curr holding that attorneys fees could not constitutionally be limited to "new money" and that to
do so was beyond the scope of statutory authority pursuant to I.e. § 72-508. Curr 692, 138.
While the doctrine of stare decisis is an important principle that ensures stability in the law, "when
the judicial interpretation of a statute is manifestly wrong, Stare decisis does not require that we
continue an incorrect reading of the statute." Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 585, 226
P.3d 524,527 (2010), citing Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut.Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130
P.3d 1127,1131 (2006).

Rhodes Should Not Be Given Stare Decisis Effect Because It Is Manifestly
Wrong, Unjust, Unwise And Brings About Injustice
Furthermore, the circumstances of this case and the weakness ofthe analysis in Rhodes
make clear that the rule should not be followed in this case:
When there is controlling precedent on questions ofIdaho law "the rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust
or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and
remedy continued injustice." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77,803 P.2d
978, 983 (1990). While it is important that parties and their counsel have predictability regarding the law so that they may make informed decisions in the conduct oftheir affairs, when the
judicial interpretation of a statute is manifestly wrong, stare decisis does not require that we
continue an incorrect reading ofthe statute. "We have stated frequently that we will not follow
prior incorrect decisions merely because the cases exist. The rule to stand by decided cases and
to maintain former adjudications contemplates more than blindly following a former decision
even if it is manifestly wrong." Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 256, 805 P.2d 452, 462
(1991).
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. o/Idaho, 142 Idaho 589,592-93, 130 P.3d 1127, 113031 (2006). (Emphasis supplied.)
"While we are cognizant of the importance stare decisis plays in the judicial process, we are
not hesitant to reverse ourselves when a doctrine, a defense, or a holding in a case, has proven
over time to be unjust or unwise." Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 990, 695 P.2d 369,375
(1985).
State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 661, 8 P.3d 652,656 (2000).
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VI. THE COMMISSION TACITLY RECOGNIZES THAT ITS REGULATION HAs THE PRACTICAL
EFFECT OF REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF LAW

It would appear that the Commission accepts the fact that its current regulation is having

the effect not just of regulating fees, but also of regulating the practice of law by making representation difficult or impossible for some claimants, but simply feels it needs this Court's "guidance."
As well, the current rule may make it impossible for certain injured workers who desire counsel to find someone who is willing to take their case for the small recompense that the particular facts of that case may offer. (Emphasis supplied.)

Findings OfFact And Conclusions OfLaw Relating To Counsel's Request For Approval OfAttorney's Fees --Agency Recordp. 45.
Quite apart from whether the current Industrial Commissioners agree with the policies that
were thought to be advanced by the 1994 attorney fee regulation, this Commission is obligated
to apply this valid regulation, the fundamental underpinnings of which have passed constitutional muster. As noted in this Commission's decision in Kulm, practical difficulties frequently
arise when trying to apply the regulation. It is a regulation that would benefit, perhaps, from
studied revision. The Commission is particularly mindful, as was the Court, of the fact that attorneys frequently provide a valuable service to an injured worker which does not result in the
creation of a fund from which the attorney can otherwise be paid. Even so, the regulation is
what it is, and the Commission is constrained to apply its unambiguous language. The Commission has acted based on its beliefthat this regulation is not only constitutional, but that it
was correctly applied to the facts ofthe three cases at issue in this consolidated appeal. Nevertheless, the Commission would welcome any guidance or direction that this Court may give
concerning the continuing implementation of its authority under I.C. § 72-803 or the Commission's interpretation and application of the current regulation to the facts in this appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent's Brief, p. 25. There is a bit of a "stop me before I strike again" quality to the Commission's observations concerning a regulation that, whatever it may argue, has not been applied
uniformly or consistently.
As stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, what is at stake in this appeal, is the ability of
Workers Compensation claimants to hire an attorney and pay a portion of benefits that they ultimately receive, whether disputed or not, for legal services that an attorney is either 1) ethically required to deliver as a part of his representation (by this Court's Rules of Professional Conduct as
discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, "IDAPA 17.02.08.033 As Construed In Johnson Intrudes
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Upon The Province Of The Judiciary And Conflicts With Judicial Policy By Creating Ethical
Problems Directly Affecting The Practice OfLaw," at 31-34), or 2) might otherwise refuse to provide by limiting the scope of his representation to disputed matters. The Affidavit of Laurel Kulm
filed in support of Appellant's motion for attorney fees speaks to the need for such legal services
and the reason that "guidance or direction" is sorely needed, hopefully in the form of this Court's
reiteration of the unequivocal yet ignored core holding in Curr: "Finally, the 'new money' provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72508." Curr 692, 138. Claimant Kulm sought out Appellant for advice, counsel and representation
knowing that no actual dispute had manifested itself precisely to make sure that one did not arise:
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the runaround from the worker's compensation adjuster; I had been told that I might not have a case; I
had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was pre-existing from degenerative disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted advice on what to do; I
wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I wanted an attorney to fight for me.
I believed that I was getting pushed around because I did not have a lawyer.
10. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent
fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested, but it was worth it to me
because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal counselor and as my advocate.
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis.
16. I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72
to support my Counsel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, I knowingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full.
Affidavit of Claimant Laurel Kulm, Agency Record p. 89-90. (Emphasis supplied).
Perhaps most significantly, even if Ms. Kulm had been able to pay for the legal services
she desired on an hourly basis, the conclusion to Respondent's briefto the effect that the Commission considers itself stuck with an inherited regulation which it feels "obligated" to follow that
precludes compensation to attorneys other than in disputed matters, makes it clear that Ms. Kulm
could not have retained an attorney to assist her on an hourly basis. 14 Although the Commission

Since Courts are guided in their interpretation of administrative regulations, by administrative interpretations, the
present Commission could have obtained some guidance simply by consulting with Commission staff to determine how

14
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relies upon the Rhodes' application of a "rational relationship" test to the Commission's predecessor regulation, and Rhodes' finding that that regulation promoted "sure and certain relief for injured workers" (Rhodes 142, 470), it is difficult to conclude that a regulation promotes sure and
certain relief when it makes it impossible for Workers Compensation claimants to retain attorneys
to guide them through a complex statutory scheme in which they are pitted against attorneys and
seasoned Workers Compensation adjusters.
This principle extends to our review of administrative rules, and it is this Court's responsibility
to determine the validity of the rule. "[A]dministrative rules are invalid which do not carry into
effect the legislature's intent as revealed by existing statutory law, and which are not reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation." (Citations omitted).
Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583, 21 P.3d 903,905 (2001). Rhodes summarily concluded, "There is a rational relationship between the legitimate legislative purpose to foster sure
and certain relief for injured workers and the attorney fee regulation. The limit imposed by the
regulation furthers the purpose by making the cost of attorneys paid from new money less burdensome." Rhodes 142,470. Respectfully, it is a stretch to construe I.C. § 72-201 's declaration of police power justifying the substitution of a no-fault system for the right to sue in tort based on fault,
as carte blanche to carve out attorney representation in whatever way the Commission's evershifting composition of political appointees may choose:
Declaration of police power. The common law system governing the remedy of workmen
against employers for injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in industrial and
public work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends
upon its industries and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho,
therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases ofthe
premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured
workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault
and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such

the regulation had been applied in the past as a guide to how it had been interpreted. The record reflects, and
Appellant assures this Court, that the regulation was not applied in the past to require that benefits had to be disputed
in order for an attorney to take attorneys fees from them. See, Seiniger Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 27 II. 1-18,
infra.
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personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this law provided. (Emphasis supplied.)
By Rhodes' reasoning, the Commission could effectively preclude attorney representation
of Claimants altogether by making it simply financially impossible to undertake representation.
Even given the current popular animus towards Plaintiffs and Claimant's attorneys, one doubts
that this Court would tolerate such an intrusion into the regulation ofthe practice of law under the
Idaho Constitution and in view ofLC. § 3-205. Indeed, it would arguably make infinitely more
sense to preclude Defendants from retaining legal counsel if the Commission sincerely wanted to
make relief for injured workers more "sure and certain." Notwithstanding Rhodes' incantation of
"sure and certain relief,,,15 Appellant is confident that not a member ofthis Court believes that a
regulation that prohibited Workers Compensation sureties from paying for legal counsel (or paying them more than $10 as apparently acceptable to the United States Supreme Court) would be
upheld as valid and constitutional. Yet, this is exactly what Rhodes implies is perfectly acceptable. Surely, the phrase "sure and certain" relief contained in the Idaho Workers Compensation
Act's Declaration of Police Power is simply a synonym for "no-fault" rather than a blanket grant
of authority to regulate to the point of elimination the right to counsel in Workers Compensation
cases. Obviously, if an agency exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers has the right
to limit claimant's counsel's compensation so that he can only be paid for "disputed" matters, any
agency and the legislature has the same power with respect to all attorneys. Would an act prohibiting all attorney compensation other than in "disputed" matters be constitutional if such an act
included a declaration of police power including a perfunctory recitation that the high cost of legal

15 Ironically, this interpretation effectively presents the mirror image of the order struck down in Idaho State Bar Ass'n v.
Idaho PUb. Utilities Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672,637 P.2d 1168 (1981). In Idaho State Bar the Idaho Pub. Utilities
Commission entered an order permitting corporations appearing before it to be represented by non-attorneys. That
case held that this order violated the separation of powers doctrine and this Court's exclusive role in supervising the
practice of law by permitting representation by non-attorneys. This case, in contrast, presents this Court with the
question of whether the Commission can by regulation effectively prohibit attorney representation to the extent it
desires under the apparently limitless umbrella of providing "sure and certain relief."
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services imposes an unnecessary and commerce chilling burden on the economy ofIdaho? Would
a law be constitutional that limited all attorney compensation to $10 for all services performed in
connection with a matter, such as a real estate closing, a divorce, a corporate merger? The fact
that the suggestions are absurd, does not compel the conclusion that the analogies are inapt. The
fundamental principle is that if it is within the Commission's or the legislature's power to decide
what services claimants' counsel can be paid for, and place limitations other than reasonableness
upon such payment, it is within any agency's or the legislature'S power to do so for all attorneys
for any category of service it chooses. The playing field in every legal arena would be subject to
being tilted by whatever faction controls the levers of power.
Significantly, effectively preventing counsel from becoming involved in cases other than
with respect to disputed matters by denying them compensation creates problems for Defendants
as well as Workers Compensation claimants:
Oftentimes in my practice I have seen adjusters and even sureties strongly recommend or insist
that claimants go see an attorney to get the thing resolved. We all recognize the value ofhaving an attorney on the other side, because oftentimes these cases can't get resolved that should
be resolved until that happens. Ifwe make it impossible by artificially eliminating what they
may be receiving, we are not going to have that ability to do so and people are going to uncompensated that should be compensated. It clogs up the system. Having said that, I'm not
suggesting that you have a carte blanche rule, I'm suggesting just utilizing -- if you want to use
a calendar approach, a presumption that the person did something and certainly when you have
a rating out there of 12 percent (the percentage impairment rating obtained by Appellant from
Dr. Radnovich - Hearing Transcript p. 11 11. 20-22) you have a real incentive to go out and get
one you know that's going to be lower and pay it. In most ofthese cases, you know, with disability -- I don't care whether it's two percent or 12 percent, because impairment -- disability
includes impairment. The question is, is there a rating and are there restrictions. That's what
determines the value of these claims. And I think these attorneys are earning their fee and the
proof of that seeing the kind of people who don't have attorneys and to me it's really increasing. I always ask the person at deposition, you know, have you talked to an attorney. Yeah,
I've talked to an attorney, they wouldn't take my case. What happened? I was just told just go
ahead and file and they will take care of you. I'm not being taken care of.
Testimony ofAlan Hull, Hearing Transcript p. 181. 20 to p. 191. 23. (Emphasis supplied). The
Commission's "claim consultants" are advising people regarding litigating claims. As reflected in
Mr. Hull's testimony, the Commission does not believe that Claimant's counsel should be paid for
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simply giving advice, but it pays non-lawyers on its staff to do so.

VII. RESPONDENT'S REVIEW OF THE ApPLICATION OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 To THE FACTS
IN THESE CASES

Notwithstanding 1) the fact that only purely constitutional issues are presented by this appeal, 2) that for strategic purposes Appellant has conceded for purposes of appeal that he cannot
demonstrate that he met the standards contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 under attack by "primarily and substantially" creating the "available funds" related to the PPI benefits in each ofthe
consolidated cases, and 3) that Appellant made no effort to offer evidence on the factual issues
implicated by the attorney fee provisions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01/ 6 Respondent's brief spends
considerable time analyzing how it determined that Appellant had not met that standard. Appellant does not want to devote too much time to replying to that portion of Respondent's brief, since
it is not necessary for purposes ofthe issues raised on appeal. However, one aspect ofthe facts
contained in the record regarding Appellant's efforts deserves attention, because of its implications
with respect to judicial policy, and is discussed in the next section ofthis brief.

VIII. THERE Is A SCHISM BETWEEN IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01 As WRITTEN AND THE WAY
THA T IT WAS INTERPRETED AND ENFORCED

Respondent Commission traces the genesis ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 to the issuance on
January 9, 1990 of an "informal" rule (lAR 72-803.2) limiting attorney's fees to "new money."
... [P]ut in writing for the first time the policy which the Commission had already been following - that attorney fees would only be awarded against those contested benefits which the
attorney had already obtained for the claimant. 'As in the past, the Commission will not apIn Steinmetz and Gomez, Appellant filed formal documents to that effect, and the record in Kulm reflects the same,
notwithstanding the testimony of Attorney Alan Hull offered for a different purpose.

16

For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the constitutionality of the applicable
IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits
paid as consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test."
For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the constitutionality of the applicable
IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants "disputed"
the permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum settlement
(LSS) before the Defendants paid those benefits.
Claimant's Counsel's Admissions For Attorney Fee Hearing, Steinmetz case, CR 467-468, Gomez Case, CR 567-568.
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prove fees based upon benefits already paid by the employer or surety, or upon uncontested
benefit amounts to be paid by employer or surety prior to the selection of an attorney. Fees
will be assessed against "new money" only, i.e., benefits which counsel directly succeeded in
obtaining on client's (sic.) behalf. IAR 72-803.2 (Appendix, Document #4, fourth paragraph.)'

Respondent's Brief. p. 14. Emphasis added. Whether or not this statement is accurate depends on
what it means to "obtain" benefits for claimant, and what "benefits which counsel directly succeeded in obtaining on client's (sic.) behalf' means. As the testimony in the record reflects, in the
past the Commission has not applied its rules to require that Workers Compensation claimants'
counsel prove that benefits were actually disputed. For almost thirty years, Appellant has handled
Workers Compensation cases that were settled on a lump sum basis and the attorney took a percentage fee on the lump sum consideration, either without having to demonstrate that benefits
were actually disputed, or at most having simply to demonstrate that the attorney was instrumental
in obtaining the impairment rating. There is testimony in the record from attorneys practicing before the Commission whose tenure before it exceeds that of the present Commissioners. Attorney
Alan Hull, essentially the Dean of the Worker's Compensation bar in view of his years of specialized practice in that area, testified at the hearing as follows:
But the interpretation is up to you and we didn't see the interpretation where it's presumed that
PPI wasn't subject to attorney's fees until about 12 years ago.

Testimony ofAllan Hull, Hearing Transcript p. 911. 6-9.
Now, I have done this for about 30 years and since Kerr (sic.) was decided and the new regulations were passed, up until about a year ago it was possible to pass the threshold with the
claims consultants simply by saying -- they said, well, give us a letter that shows that you requested the impairment rating and that's satisfactory. Okay. The present decision and what we
get out of the -- the informal determination is that that is no longer enough. That we have to
show, number one, that there is a dispute and we have to show, essentially, that we overcame
the wrestling match. Okay? Now, if these are to be clear guidelines, it is impossible for both
of those interpretations of the same regulation to be correct.

Seiniger Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 2711. 1-18.
Appellant has handled hundreds of Workers Compensation cases before the Idaho Industrial Commission. If the Respondent Commission is representing that its present regulation as applied is in essence the same as the "informal rule" (IAR 72-803.2), Appellant, as an officer ofthis
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Court, can assure this Court that any representation that the Commission is simply continuing its
present practice with respect to and the interpretation ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is not accurate.
It has only been within the last several years that Appellant was asked to produce more than a let-

ter to the Claimant's physician requesting an impairment rating to satisfY the requirements of
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 to justifY taking an attorney fee on a permanent impairment rating. If the
present Commission's interpretation ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is correct, it may well be that
prior Commissions (including two ofthe present Commissioners) were lax in its application, but it
is simply not true that the Commission has consistently limited attorney fees to "new money" generated as a result of a "dispute." Indeed, in all three cases on appeal here attorney's fees were approved on benefits other than for permanent impairment paid under the lump sum agreements,
with no showing by the Appellant that those benefits were "primarily or substantially" obtained by
his efforts as a result of a dispute, other than the simple perfunctory recitation contained in every
lump sum agreement of matters disputed in general. The simple fact is that the Commission as
presently composed, believes that attorney's fees should not be paid on impairment absent a dispute, but accepts that attorney's fees on disability (in excess of impairment) can be paid even if
there is no proof that disability beyond impairment was actually disputed. 17 Whatever the fate of

17 This continues to be the case as demonstrated by the comments of Commissioner Baskin at the hearing in the Kulm
case on appeal here:

With respect to the facts of this case, I mean it seems clear to me -- at least I'm satisfied that that standard
was met with respect the PPD benefits that were paid prior to the lump sum settlement. You went out and did
what good claimant's attorney would do on these, you obtained a vocational opinion from - in this case Mrs. Barros-Bailey that supported a determination that there was, indeed, some disability in excess of impairment and the
surety, for whatever reason, started paying it prior to the settlement of the case in chief and, you know, I'm satisfied on that showing that it was, indeed, your efforts that were primarily and substantially responsible for securing
that fund. (Emphasis supplied.) But I have a different issue with respect to the PPI benefits. Where is the showing in that case or with respect to that fund that it was your efforts that were responsible for securing it?
And, you know, I've thought a great deal about the available fund issue, too. I can tell you have. It seems to
me that available funds assuredly include funds, the entitlement to which had not been determined until after you
were retained as counsel. In other words, claimant's in a period of recovery at the time you're retained. Time
passes, she's pronounced medically stable and she's found to be entitled to a PPI award and say it's the treating
physician that comes up with that decision at the request of the surety. Now, that seems to me to be within the
definition of what available funds are. It's something that was not disputed, but it became an entitlement that arose
after your retention in the case. I think it falls within the ambit of what is meant by available funds. The problem
that I struggle with is that I see that the available funds to which a charging lien attaches are further constrained by
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this appeal, its outcome should rise or fall on the reality of practice before the Commission and the
actual history of the interpretation and application ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01. Whatever the continued vitality of the Constitutional guarantees recognized in Curr, those guarantees deserve at
least the dignity of being considered in light of reality and not an administrative fiction.

IX.

THE COMMISSION CONFUSES SPECULATION AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Although the Appellant does not challenge the Commission's exercise of discretion, and
did not even attempt to prove that he satisfied the requirements ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 with
respect to his claim for attorney's fees, Commissioner Baskin's interrogation of Attorney Alan
Hull points to an additional problem with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as it is being currently applied.
What the Commission missed is the distinction between speculation and reasonable inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence. What Mr. Hull actually offered was circumstantial evidence:
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: "But since the regs that we have got are the ones that are applicable right now, I would be interested, Mr. Hull, in your comments on what it means to be
primarily and substantially responsible for securing a fund, particularly against the background
of this case, which, as I understand it, Mr. Seiniger did go out and retain the services of Dr.
Radnovich in June of2007. Dr. Radnovich did issue an impairment rating, which was 12 percent of the whole person or thereabouts. The surety did not pay it, refused to pay it, I'm not
exactly sure why. It may have been because they were taking the position that the claimant
was not medically stable at that time. But, at any rate, it was not until October of '07 that the
surety obtained its own rating from Dr. Rogers and it was a six percent impairment rating.
That was the rating that was paid if it's not a situation where the ratings were average and the
average paid. The only rating that was paid was the six percent rating. So, with that background, your comments on -- on how it is that that fund of money -- how we should view that
in light of the requirements that we only entertain a request for an attorney fee on that sum that
is demonstrated that counsel's efforts were primarily and substantially responsible for securing
the fund."
MR. HULL: "As I told the Commission in our telephone conference, we were hired only to
the next provision, which contains the four sub parts that have to be met here, not in the disjunctive. Among them
is the requirement that counsel demonstrate that his efforts were primarily and substantially responsible for securing the funds from which he hopes to be paid. That's where I get hung up. And I am particularly interested in -- in
your comments, as well as Mr. Hull's on what that means in our current regulatory scheme and what is the proof
that we should look at to be satisfied that your efforts were primarily or substantially responsible for securing that
fund.
Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 37 I. 8 to p. 39 I. 2. It is obvious that the Commission is applying a different standard to
permanent impairment benefits than it is to disability benefits, notwithstanding Respondent's briefs representation in
conclusion that it considers itself constrained by IDAPA 17.02.08.033 to award attorneys fees only with respect to disputed benefits. Commissioner Baskin's comments also directly conflict with the order entered in Rodriguez.
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draft this and, unfortunately, the adjuster is no longer in the country, so I don't know what their
thought process is, but let me suggest to you the following: Until Dr. Radnovich's rating came
aboard there was no effort to get a rating by the surety and as you know from practice, oftentimes that's the case. Claimant's counsel will force the surety to get them a rating. Having
done that, it seems to me that big fund of money that came about, at least partially and probably significantly because of the result of claimant's counsel. I mean a lot of times the adjuster
will not get a rating until they are forced into doing that and, certainly, it would appear that
that was the case here."
Hearing Transcript p. 11 1.13 to p. 13 1.2. (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Hull's testimony was rejected
as "entirely speculative." Order On Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration, Agency Record p.
432. Mr. Hull urged the Commission to create a presumption to reflect the fact that in his long
experience, obtaining an impairment rating spurs an adjuster to obtain their own impairment rating
(generally more favorable to the employer/surety) and pay that rating. However, it is unlikely that
an adjuster would ever admit that this was her motivation for a variety of reasons. Presumptions
can be created to correct an imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to the proof. 2
McCormick On Evid. § 343 (6th ed.). However, a presumption is not needed because correctly
viewed, Mr. Hull's testimony that Appellant obtained an impairment rating that was then followed
by the adjuster obtaining and paying an impairment rating from another physician was circumstantial evidence that the payment of the second impairment rating was prompted by Appellant. This,
in the face of no evidence to the contrary, should have been sufficient to carry the day for Appellant, had he chosen to raise the factual issue of his meeting the standards ofIDAP A
17.02.08.033.01 at issue.
The Commission mischaracterizes Appellant's position as an argument "that the involvement of an attorney always spurs the recalcitrant surety to toe the line and do things in a timely
fashion." Respondent's Brief, p. 23. (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant has never made such an argument, though he does argue that this often proves to be the case. This argument is made, however, not to support the further argument that Appellant should be presumed to have satisfied the
burden of proof contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, but to point out that in many cases it simply
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may be impossible to satisfy that burden due to the subtle realities of the negotiations that take
place over months or years in the handling of a complex Workers Compensation case.
That is a different issue than the character of Mr. Hull's testimony. Consider the implications of not accepting such proof as circumstantial evidence. Impairment ratings are often paid
months or years prior to a lump sum settlement. In the Kulm case, the adjuster was out of the
country at the time of hearing. Is Claimant's counsel to depose the adjuster, perhaps multiple
times, as benefits are paid out to make a record of the reasons that the adjuster made the decision
to pay the benefits? Suppose that, as in Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d
735 (2000), the adjuster simply testifies that the benefits were paid on advice of counsel. Checkmate? Yes, if one follows the Commission's reasoning and, regrettably, this Court's reasoning in

Johnson: "All of this testimony supports the conclusion that any work Pena did was directed at
encouraging Boise Cascade to accept full responsibility for the medical bills related to the two
later surgeries, which they questioned but fully accepted immediately after consulting with outside
counsel, not as a result of anything Pena did." Johnson 353, 738. 18 Again, Appellant has not
raised the Commission's exercise of discretion (on factual issues essentially abandoned in the
hearings below) on appeal. However, since the Commission was determined below (see, decisions in Kulm) to relitigate that which was not actually litigated in the first place, it falls to the
Appellant to point out the error in its reasoning.
X. RESPONDENT'S REVIEW OF PRIOR CASES INVOLVING ONLY CHALLENGES To THE
COMMISSION'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION Is FLAWED

Respondent goes to some lengths to review this Court's prior opinions in Mancilla v. Greg,

18 The implications of Johnson are troubling in that if a claimant's attorney has the burden of proof to establish the motivation of the adjuster in paying a claim, any reliance on advice of its counsels waives the attorney-client privilege. ''This
Court has also recognized that the attorney-client privilege is a defensive shield and not an offensive sword." In re Niday, 15 Idaho 559,566,98 P. 845 (1908). Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,420,565 P.2d 1374,1377 (1977); 8
Wigmore, supra, s 2327 at 638. See also: McCormick on Evidence, s 91 at 191 and s 93 at 194-95 (2d ed. 1972);
Comment, supra, 9 U.C.D. L. Rev. at 496-502, 509-511, 518-520. It would appear from Johnson that the surety's reliance on its counsel's advice was used a sword against Mr. Pena.
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131 Idaho 685, 687, 963 P.2d 368, 370 (1998), Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 134 Idaho
350,352,2 P.3d 735, 737 (2000; rehearing denied 16 Jun 2000), and Cheung v. Perra, 143 Idaho
30, 137 P.3d 417 (2006; rehearing denied June 29, 2006). Respondent's Brief, p. 20-22. Respondent asserts: "In all three of these cases, Mancilla, Johnson, and Cheung, this Court examined and
upheld the Commission's application of provisions of the current regulation that is again being
challenged by Seiniger in this case." Respondent's Brief, p. 22. Appellant will not discuss these
cases, because each dealt essentially with whether or not the record before this Court contained
substantial and competent evidence to support the exercise of discretion in applying the applicable
sections ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 (the attorney fee regulation), not its statutory authority or constitutionality. Appellant makes no such argument here, and therefore these cases are inapposite.
This appeal deals only with the issues of statutory authority and constitutionality.
XI. CONCLUSION
The discussion of constitutional questions throws a luster round the bar, and gives dignity to
its functions, which rarely belong to the profession in any other country. Lawyers are here
emphatically placed as sentinels upon the outposts of the constitution; and no nobler end can
be proposed for their ambition or patriotism, than to stand as faithful guardians of the constitution, ready to defend its legitimate powers, and to stay the arm of legislative, executive or
popular oppression.
Joseph Story, Address before Suffolk Bar, Boston, 4, September, 1821, in Miscellaneous Writings

ofJoseph Story 198,227-228 (William W. Story ed. 1852) It is with the greatest humility and
trepidation that Appellant takes this appeal, because he fears that rather than vindicating the important principals that motivate him, securing the right of claimants like Laurel Kulm to retain an
attorney to counsel, advise and represent her even in undisputed matters, he may only succeed in
prompting the issuance of an opinion offering the Commission what it asks for, an advisory opinion characterized as "guidance." Respectfully, "guidance" of the dubious quality offered by the

dicta in Rhodes relying itselfupon dicta in Triplett and Walters, will further undermine the judicial office of attorney and concomitantly the authority of the judiciary itself. The principle anAPPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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nounced in Rhodes in dicta, that any restriction on the ability of an attorney and client to agree to
the measure and mode of compensation is acceptable so long as the lawyer is paid something, is
one which, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow a legislature dominated by any faction to
effectively tip the scales of justice irrevocably in its favor. Over the years, Appellant has developed a profound respect for the reasoning and wisdom ofthis Court. However, Appellant cannot
shrink from what he considers a moral obligation to challenge the dicta in Rhodes permitting the
legislature or any agency effectively to deny one side the right to counsel, which, however permissible that may be under a relaxed due process analysis, clearly intrudes on this Court's regulation
of the practice of law.
Perhaps it is asking too much to expect this Court to accept Appellant's representation that
he knows he would be financially better off simply declining clients with small cases, and that for
over thirty years he has accepted virtually every Workers Compensation claimant that has asked to
retain him, whether or not it appeared that it would be profitable to do so, believing that by doing
so he was fulfilling the spirit of his attorney's oath. Appellant does believe, however, that this
Court will accept the logic of the argument that if the Idaho Industrial Commission can carve out
the areas of legal service that an attorney can charge for, then so too can every other agency and
branch of government.
This Court considers access to justice so essential that attorneys are required to swear that
they "will never reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed." Appellant has taken this oath seriously and he believes that he has lived up to it. The
oath, and the fact that the Court can require an attorney as an officer of the Court to perform services at no compensation if necessary, make it clear that the practice of law is not merely "economic activity" that should be subject to economic regulation at the whim of another branch of
government.

Contrary to the Commission's paraphrasing of Appellant's argument, he does not
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contend that any attempt by the Commission to use objective criteria to measure "reasonableness"
is "unconstitutional." However, it is consistent with the judiciary's exclusive right and responsibility to regulate the practice of law to limit a co-ordinate branch of government's right to "approve" attorneys fees under I.C. § 72-803 or even to "regulate" them, so that any standard, objective or subjective, does not infringe upon the exclusive right of the jUdiciary to regulate the practice of law. To the extent that either co-ordinate branch of government or agency adopts its own
standards limiting what services an attorney can be paid to perform, or what a client can agree to
pay apart from considerations of reasonableness, that exclusive power is infringed upon.
Despite the plain language ofIdaho Code § 3-205, Rhodes deals with the rights and duties
of attorneys with respect to the measure and mode of compensation, as if it were dealing with any
other "economic regulation." Rhodes 142,470. If Rhodes literally means what it says, the Commission has "exclusive jurisdiction" and could pass a regulation that all fee agreements entered
into by Claimants are to be enforced according to their terms, without regard to reasonableness,
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 or this Court's cases regarding the factors to be considered
in determining if fees are reasonable, if supported by the proverbial peppercorn. Of course, this
example is unlikely, but for purposes of analysis, it illustrates that Rhodes essentially abandons the
field that it claims to hold exclusively. Clearly, this Court views the regulation of attorney's fees
to be within the exercise of its regulation of the practice of law. It may be that factors other than
those contained in Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 and in this Court's cases are appropriate for the Commission to consider in approving attorneys fees, but whatever factors it considers,
they cannot conflict with the Separation Of Powers Doctrine, I.C. § 3-205, the First Amendment,
and the other constitutional guarantees vouched safe in Curro
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Respectfully submitted April 2, 2012.

Will Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Appellant/Real Party in Interest

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On April 2, 2012 I served two copies of the foregoing by hand delivery on: Lawrence G. Wasden,
Blair D. Jaynes, Industrial Commission, 700 S. Clearwater Lane, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID
83720-0041, Facsimile: (208) 334-5145, Telephone: (208) 334-6028, Attorneys for Respondent

Will Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Appellant/Real Party in Interest
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JULIE Mt.lWi SElNIGEIl
~
tIM Dimi# t(cu.....

u.s..

"""

S~ber19,2oo9

VIA EMAIL TOpurdue2you@msn.com
And VIA u.s. MAlL
LaureIKulm
2090 Avenida de las Alturas
Santa Fe, NM 87505
RE:

Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center

Dear Laurel:
This is in follow-up to the Skype conversation you bad with Breck and me on or about
September 11,2009. As you know, we have inquired if you would be interested in
executing an affidavit in support of our claim of attorney' s fees on the permanent partial
Impairment (pPI) rating benefits, and on a portion of the permanent partial disability
(PPD) benefits, paid on the injury that is the subject of your worker's compensation case

before the Idaho Industrial Commission in which we are representing you.
The amount involved is $330 1.72, which is the amount of attorney fees that the Industrial
Commission ruled in its Order filed 9/4/09 to have not been substantiated as reasonable.
(The Order was emailed to you earlier.)
Unless the ColIllllission or an appellate court changes the Order, you will receive the
additional sum of$330L72, instead of that sum being awarded to us for attorney fees.
(Of course, regardless of this issue you will still also receive the $9740.00 as set forth in
the Lump Sum Agreement you signed.)
This raises a conflict of interest on our part, in that it is against your financial interest to
support our claim for these attorneys' fees. I have attached a copy ofIdaho Rule of
Pmfession Conduct 1.7 and its Commentaty for your review, which addresses conflicts of

interest between clients and lawyers (which can arise from the lawyer's own interests as
mentioned in Commentary [1)). You can go to the following web site to review the rules
of ethics. from which I copied the attached rule:
http:tr!Sb.idaho.gov/generallrules(!!pC.html.
A lawyer has an obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Therefore,
during the phone conversation we had last week, we advised you of certain things that

942 W. MYRTI.E STREET
BoISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000

Fax: (208) 345-4700

---~- . ~~~-- EXHIBIT

Andrew@ScinigerLaw.com
www.SemigetLaw.com

IL --

APPENDIX
Letter to Laurel Kulm Advising of Conflict of Interest and Waiver of Conflict

- [II] -

•

September 19,2009
Page2of9

•

will be included in your affidavit concerning this conflict of interest if you elect to waive
any conflict of interest and file an affidavit in support of our claim for attorneys fees on
the PPI and PPD benefits obtained for you for your injury. The proposed affidavit will be
sent to you under separate cover.

It: after reviewing the attached, you still wish to file an affidavit in support ofour motion
for attorney fees, I request that you sign the attached waiver and return it to me. Again,
you have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or sign an affidavit supporting our
claim for those attorney's fees. Thank you.
Cordially,
~/;'l~4,...
Andrew Marsh

P.S. You may scan and email your signed waiver. or you may fax it to our temporary fax
number of208-433·9727. In any event, please also mail an original of your signature to
us. Thank you.
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t.oyalIy 10 a _ _ ~ uncIeItaldng ~ dIIuc:tI!' _ 1 0 that _
wIIhouI that cIIent's
Infol'mecl consent. 1"111$, _ _ consent. a Iawyar may not ad aa an acIvocate in one _
against a pet10n IMlawyet
repmenIs In some OIlIer matIef. _
wIMIn 1M matlel'l1Ilt wholly UIII'elIIlId. The dienI II 10 whom 1M ~ Is
dlredIy _
II Ilkeiy 10 lIIeI bmlyed. and 1M raauItlng damage 10 !he ~ IlIIatIonship II IbIy 10 Impair tile
Iawye<'S abIliIy 10 ~ 1M cllent~. In addiIIon, !he dienI on ""'- btIJaIf!he _
1IIpI~ Is
undertaken reasonably may !1m that !he Iawyar wi pwwe that cIIent's _ ' - elfIIcI\IIeIJ out of IIeferenee 10 !he other
cfiant. I.e•• lItal tile ~ may be matarIa!Iy IimIIad by tile Iawye<'S InWMt In I'IiIIaIIIInII 1M _
dIent.
SImiIaIiy. a dir8<:1Iy _ _ cmftIct may 8IIse wIMIn a Iawyar II ,.quIIed 10 ctOIIHlI8mIne 8 _
WhO appem$ 88 8
_ _ In a la'wsuft InvaIvInO anotIler cfiant. as wIMIn !he taaIimOnY wi be danIagIIIg to !he _
WhO Is ~ In
!he lawsuit. On !he other hand. ~ re~llaIIcI, in IIMIIa1ed matIeI'I of dIenta Wb088 inIIInIsIs 8iI8 only
eccnomically advetw. 1M:!! 88 _1tIIIlon of 00/IlIlIIIiI1G economic ~ in UIII'elIIlId iIIIQIdIon. does not
01lllnaJ1ly oonsIiIute a confticl of inIetest and IItIl5 may not requIRI _ _ of tile ~ dIenta.

[Ill

[7J
0IIeeIIy. _ _ can also _
in _
matiere. For example. if a lawyer Is uked 10
tile seller of a buein88& In ~ with a buyer ~ by !he lawyer, not in tile _
transaction bulin anotIler.
unrelated _ . !he lawyarcould not ~ tile ~ wIIhouI!he informed _ _ of each client.

~

[Ill In addIIloo 10 _
willi OIlIer current dIenta. a lawye(s duII88 of loyally and Independence may be matarIa!Iy
limited by ~ 10 fonner dIents Under Ruis 1.9 or by tile IawyeI's responslbIIitie to other pet1OnS. 1M:!! as
ftduda!y duII88 arising from a lawyet's MIYIc:e 88 a _ . _ _ or c::otpOtatei dncIot.

[101 The iawyet's own In_ _ not be permIIIad 10 _
an _
e1I'ect on ~taIion of a client. For
a""",pIe. If !he probily of a lawye(s own conduct In a transaction Is In seriout question. II may be diIIIcuII or ImpoAIbIa for
tile Iawyar to gIVe a _
deIacIIed advice. SImiIaIiy. when a lawyer has dlecuastons concamIng possIbIII ampIeyment
with an opponent of !he IawyeI's - . or with a law IImI represanllng 1M opponent. 1M:!! dlecuastons COUld IIIIIlIriaIIy
limit tile Iawyet'a IIIpI88&ntaIion of !he dlenl In addIIloo. a lawyer may not allow IIIIaIad bwIIness InWMts 10 ailed
~. for example. by refening dIents to an enI8IpIIsa In which !he lawyer _
an undIscIosad IInanc:IaIInIIIAIsI.
See Rule 1.8 lor specIIIc Rules paI1aIning 10 II IlIIII'Ibet of personaIlnWMt
bwIIness transactions with
dienIs. See also Ruis 1.10 (personaI1nIImISI_ under RuIs 1.7 0IdInarIIy lilt not ImpuIIId 10 other lawyers In a law

_.1neIudIng

1ImI).

\M>en lawyers IIIpI88aIIliI!g dlIfimlnI dIents In tile same _
or In $UbsIantiIIIy IIIIeIed _
lilt c:IosaIY teIe1ad
by blood. maniaga or oIber domaslIc teIaI!onahlp. IheI1I may be • aIgnlIIcanllist that _
conIderu:es wi be J!IW8Ied
and that !he Iawyet'a domaslIc reIaIionshIp wIiIlnIerfere willi boIh loyalty and Independent profasalonal judgmenI. As a
result. each _
Is anlIIIed 10 know of tile exIstenoa and ImpIic:aIlons of !he IlIIatIonship beIwaan !he lawyers beIilfII 1M
Iawyar agrees 10 ~ !he ~1atIon. llws. a Iawyar IIIIeIed 10 anotIler lawyer, e.lI .. 88 parent, dIIkI, sibling,
spouse or domasIic peItner. 0IdInarIIy may not I'8pI888nI a _
In a _
WIIaI8 that lawyer Is fIIPI8I4IIIIInl anoIber
party. unIeaa each _
gives InfomIad consent. The dIsquaIIIicatio arieIAo from • dOse famIy or domIIIIic IlIIatIonship
Is personal and 0IdinariIy Is not IrIipu1ad 10 membenI of IImIa willi whom !he lawyers are II8IlOda!ed. See RuIs 1.10.
(11)

lIZ!
A Iawyar 1& prohIbbed from anga;In; In sexual reialicnships willi a _ _ !he sexual reIaIionshIp predates
tile fomIation of tile cIIenHawyer reIaIionshIp. See RuIs 1.8(1).
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lme_ of I'eISOII Paying for a Lawyer's Service
(13)
A ~ may be paid 110m a _
0Iher flIIm the dIent, iIIcItJdIng II coden!, If the dIImt iii iII10tmed of thal
facI and consenIs and 1IIe ~ _
not c:ompromisa 1IIe lawyel'a duty of loyally or indepJndent jIIdgmenI to 1IIe
_
See Rulli 1.8(1). If aecepIaIIee of 1IIe payment from iIIIY 0Iher _ _ presan!s a significant rlak _ 1he lawyel's
repAISeIIletion of 1he eIent will be maIefIalIy IimIIed by 1IIe IawyeI'a ownlnlemt III accommoda1ing 1IIe _
paying 1he
1awyeI'$ fee or by 1IIe lawyel's ~ to II payer _
Is aiao • coden!, lIlan 1he lawyer must compty WlIII1he
tlIqulremenls of ~ (1)) befonI accepIIng 1he ~, iIIcItJdIng dete/mIrIIng IVheIIIer tile ccnlIk:t iii
_
and. If so. _ lhe eIent has adeqUal4ln1cnnation about lhe material rIaks ofllle~.

..,._1aIlon

[14)
0n:Ilnarily, client! may consent to
(1)). some ccnlIk:ts IIRI nonconsenIabIe. meaning _

notwIIhsIanding a c:cnIIk:t. However. as IItdk:aIed In ~
lhe ~ ~ cannot ~ ask for SUCh agraamenl or
~ Is I8pI888!lIIng 11lOI'II lIlan _
dIenI, 1he

provide represantafion on 1IIe basis of 1he dlent's consent When 1he
question of consantabIIIIy must be resolved as 10
cflel\l.

""'*'

_1aIlon

[IS! ConIIentablllly Is fYpic:aIIy delennlned by considering whelherllle ~ of tile dIImts will be adequately protactad
If lhe dIImts IIRI permitted to give their Infolmed consent to
burdened by a oanlIicI of InIaresI. Thus. under
~ (b){I). repAISeIIletion Is p!C/IIbIIed If In 1he cItcumsIances lhe lawyer cannot reuonabIy conduda _
1he
lawyer will be able to provide ~ and dIIigaIII _ _ • See Rulli 1.1 (~) and RullI 1.3 (cIIIIgence).
[16] Paragtapll (b){2) /IeIsaibe$ oanlIicIs ilia! IIRI ~ bacauaa lhe ~tion Is ptOllib4!ed by applicable
lew. For example. In some sIales IIUbstanIIve lew provides thai lhe same lawyer may noI represanl mora flIIm ana
defIIndant in a capital case. even WlIII lhe consent of lhe dIenIs. and Under fedenII criminal &tiIluIes _
~ by II fonner govamment lawyer IIRI ptOIIib4Ied, despite 1IIe Inbmed consent of 1IIe former dlent. In
addition. dedsIonaf lew In some sIales limits 1he abIIiIy of a goverr\II18I1Ia dIenI, SUCh 11$ a munIcIpaIIIy. Ie consent 10 a
oon1IId of InIaresI.

""'*'

[17]
Peragtapll (b)(3) cIeaait>ea oanlIicIs thallIRI ~ bacauaa of 1IIe irlIdIuIlonaIlnlemt In vigorous
dIent's poslIIon when lhe dIImts .... a&!;Jned dltecIIy ~ _ _ In the same IiIIgaIIon or
deveIopmant of
_
proeei!I(!Ing befonI a 1ribunaI. Whe1het dIImts aN aligned dltecIIy against
oIher WlIIIIn the meaning of IIIIs
~ requlle$ IIXIIlIIInation of IIIe cantut of the proceeding. AftIIoutIIIIIlIa peragtapII_ not pnIducIe a lawyel's
muII!pIa represantafion of adverse psrlIas 10 a mediation (becauaa mediation Is nola pICOHdIng befoN " "1IibImIII" Under

""'*'

Ru..,I.Ojm)), such _tation may be ~ by ~ (I>){I).

[181
Informed consent requires ilia! eaciI allilcktd eIent be _
of 1he I!IIevant c:In:::umsIanca and of 1he material
and !IIlIlIO!1IlbIy btIaaeabIe ways _ IIIe oanlIicI eouId have ad-. elects on 1he ~ of thai cIIenl. See Rulli
1.0(1) (lIIbrmed consanI). The InformelIon requiNd depends on 1he ...... of 1he ccnlIk:t and 1he _
of 1he rIaks
Involved. When NPNMfttation of muII!pIa dIImts In a single mat1er Is UnderIeken. the InformelIon mus1 Include 1he
impI!caIIons of 1he common ~ including possible elects on loyally, confidentiaIIIy and lhe ~
p!MIege and 1he advantages and rIaks Involved. See CommenI.a 1301 and (31) (elfect of common repreaaIIletion on
contidentiaIiIy).
[19] Under_circumstances K may be impossible 10 make lhe disdosure necB8SIIIY to~ consent For e.amp/e.
when 1he lawyer represents diIfeIenI dientI in I1IiaIed _
and _ of the cIIenta I8fUses 10 - . I to lhe dIsdoswa
/IeC8S$8I)' Ie perm111he oIher eIent 10 make an Inbrmed dadslon, !ha lawyer cannot ~ ask 1he ta\IIlr 10 consent In
some _
lhe altemIIIIve 10 common _ _ can be ..at
party may have 10 ~ sapatIIIIII......-IlaUon
WlIII !ha possIbI\IIy of incurring addI60naI
Thesa costs.. along WlIII !ha beneIIIs of securtng sapatIIIIII repreaanIaUon•
.... fa<*n _ may be considered by !ha affedecI dIImt In dete/mIrIIng wheIher common _ _ Is In 1he dIent's

=-

""'*'

~.

(20)
P8IlI(/IIlIlII (1)) requires IIIe lawyer 10 ~ 1he informed consent of IIIe dIent. c:ontrmed In wriIIng. SUCII a
wriIIng may consIs1 of a document eocacu18d by the dIImt or one thai !ha lawyer promptly I8CORIs and InINmIts 10 lhe
eIent bIIowIng an oral consent See RullI 1.0(1)). See alSO RullI 1.0(11) (wriIIng ~ t!IIieIo1mnIc _ I . If ft Is
not I8asIbIe 10 _In or _
1ha WIllIng at 1he _
lhe eIent gives Inbmed consent then 1ha lawyer mus1 ~ ....
_
HWlIIIIn a NaSonable _ 1hareaIIer. See Rula 1.0(1)). The requIramenI of a wriIIng cM& not IUpIIIaIIt the nMd
In moat _
for tile lawyer 10 talk witllhe dIent, 10 explain lhe rIaks and advanIagae, If any, of.-1IatIon burdened
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[2lII Con1Wcts of inIenIst under pa/8QllIph$ (a)(1) and (a)(2) aris& In 0Il/IIelCtII oilier than 1I!lgaIIon. For a dIscussioI'I of
dlreetiy adwtse CM1IlcIs ill llansaclional maIIIn. . . Comment [7). RawnI facials In deWmlning ~ . . . . is
significant potentIat lor _ _ _ the duralIon and Intlmacv of the IawyeI'a I'IIfaIIonsI1lp wIIh the dIenI or

an...

clients ~. the fundIomI being petfotmed by the lawyer. the IIkaIIIIood Ihet ~ will
and the IIkaIy
pII!judioe 10 the ClIent trom the conIIItl The qUllllllon 1$ often one of ptOXimity and <leg-. See Comment 181.

(27) For example. ootdIIcit qUIIIIIIon$ may a_ In aslate planning and asIaIe~. A lawyer may be G8IIed
upon 10 pmpare wms lor several family memIlers, !ItJdI aa hIlIband and WifII. and, depending upon the c:IrcuInsIanaIs a
COIIlIic! of inIete$I may be praaant In aaIaIe admInlslnllion the 1den1ilit of the client may be UI1dear under the laW of a
pat1IcuIar jurisdIcfIon. Under one \/lew, the dIenI is the fidudaty; under _
\/lew the dIenI Is the asIaIe or trust.
including Its beneIk:Iariaa. In onIer 10 CCIYIply wIIh COIIlIic! of inIenIst roiec. the lawyer should maIca cIur the IawyeI'a
I'IIfaIIonsI1lpIo the pa/IkIs~.

cin::um&la_.

~I IMIeIttet a COIItid Is ~ dtIpeIId& on the
For example. a lawyer may no! ~ ~
pa/IkIs 10 a negoIIaIIon \III'loee 1 _ are bldamenlatly antagonIStic 10 aad't oilier. but ccmmon ~ Is
pemIIs&ibIe when! the _
818 genEIIllIy aligned In inIenIst even thoOIgII .... Is _
dlIIiIrenca In inIIInISt _ 0
them. TIIus. II lawyer may Mel< 10 ~ or adjust a tefalionslllp ~ clients on an amfcIIbIa and II'IUIII1IlIy
~$ ba$I$: lor exaMpI&, in helping 10 0/IIIII1IZlI a IluslnaaII In whIcI! two or MOta _
818 ~.
~ out the financial ~ of an ell1erpti$a In whlcll two or more clients have en inlerasl or 8ll'lllllllnlllI
property dislllbutlcn in _ _ of an asIaIe. The lawyer _ b 10 I8SOIVe poIe!ItiaIIy _
IntareaIs by developing
the parties' fIlIlIIJaI 1n!e/8$1II. OIherwiH. eacIl party might ~ 10 obtain SIIpa/lIIII repJ1!iIIIfItII. wIIh the possIbIIiIv of
inCtming ~ cost. complication or ....... flliglltlOn. GIven 111_ and _
nHevanI facIors. the clients may p.efar
lila! the lawyer act lor all of them.

(29) In eonsIdeting whether 10 repruen! tnIlIIIpI& _
in the same _ . a lawyer Mould be mIndfUl Ihet If the
falls _ t h e poIe!ItiaIIy ad_ _ _ _ be 18COIICIIed. the _
can be addi1IonaI

common

cost.

~

~

and 1IIICIImInaIIon. OIdInarlIy, the lawyer will be frlR:ed 10 WIIhdraw fIom ~ all of Ihe
clients If the common ~ falls. In soma siIIJations. Ihe risk of faIIura 1$ so great Ihet ~ flIPI_lIaIIcI. Is
pl&inIy Impossible. For exampl&. a lawyer _
~ common ~lIaIIon of clients when! oonIantIous IIIIgaIion
or negotiaIIons _
them al8 lmmInant or ccnternpIaIad. 1oforeoWr. because Ihe lawyer 1$ noqulnld 10 be lmpartiaI
~ commonly I8flI'iIIIII'lI clients, ~ of tnIlIIIpI& clients Is Improper whan • Ie unlikely Ihet Impa!tiaIily
can be 1IIlIIntaInad. Generally. If the I'IIfaIIonsI1lp between Ihe pa/IkIs hall lIIIeady .-ned 1IIIIagoftIarn. Ihe possIbIIiIv
Ihet the clients- inIe!esla can be adequalaly seM<I by common ~ Is no! very good. 0II1ar I8IevaI1t factoIs
ani ~ lila lawyer subSequenUy will ~ boll! pa/IkIs on a CIOAIInuing balls and ~ the sl\uallon ImIoIves
<::raaIinO or tan'IIInatiItO a I8ia1Ionship ~ the pa/IkIs.
(30) A partic:uIaIIy impoI1ant Iactor ill deWmIning 1IIe ~ of common ~ Is the e!rect on client·
Iawy.... COIIIidenlIalIty and the allomey_ privIIega. VWh I'IIgiII'C 10 the auomey_ privIIega. Ihe prevaifIng rule Is

IIIat. a$ ~ ~ ~ clients. Ihe privIIega dOe$no! lI\Iad\. Hence. 1 _ be a$$UIIIIId Ihet If IIIIgaIion

_las between

II1II clients.

the privIIega will no! protect any !ItJdI oornrnunIoIIIio and Ihe clients should be

80

adVIaed.
[311
As 10 Ihe duly of con1ldantiaIIIy. COI1IInued common ~ will aIr!tott oetIaInty be ~ If one
client uI<a the lawyer not 10 dIsdcse 10 the oilier dIenIlnIormaIIon relevant 10 Ihe common representatIcn. ThIs IS 80
_
Ihe lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to aad't client, and eacIl dIenI has the tight 10 be informed of eny1hing
bearing 00 lIIe ~ Ihet might aft'act Ihet cIient'5 _ _ and Ihe tight 10 expecIlhet the lawyer wII use Ihet
InIormaIIon 10 Ihet dIenI's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should. allhe 0tlI$a1 of Ihe common raprwenIalion and 8$
part of Ihe pn:iC8$$ of _nioo eacIl cIient'5 inIormed consent. advise aad't dIenIlhet Informa1Ion will be sllal8d and Ihet
the lawyer will ~ 10 WIIhdraw K one dIent decIdeIIlhet some _
malarial 10 the ~ should be kepi fIom
lite oilier. ill IImIIed _ . ft lI'Iay be appmprillle for the lawyer 10 J)I1)OIlad willi Ihe raprwenIalion whan the
clients ~ 8iQIIiled. after being propeI1y inIormed. Ihet Ihe laWyer will keep ceIIIIIn InIormaIIon confidential. For exampI&.
Ihe lawyer may I1IIISOflIIl>Iy _
lite! faIIura to dlsdoH one dlenl's InIda secta1S 10 enoIhet client will no! ad-'Y
afIect represenIaIIon imIoIvlng a jCm1! _ 1 8 between the clients and 8gnIe 10 kaep Ihet InIormaIIon contIdIIn1iaI wIIh the
inIormed OOOtIerIt of boll! clients.

1321 'M1en see4dng 10 astabllsh Of adjust a I'IIfaIIonsI1lp ~ clients, Ihe lawyer should make cIur Ihet the Iawye($

role Is no! Ihet of pa!1Iisans!llp oonnaiIy expecIad in oilier _
and. 1IIus, Ihet file clients may be !IIqUirad 10
aAWlle greater rasponsIbiD!y lor decIskIns \lien whan aad't dIent 1$ separateIy~. Any IImII:aIIonII onlhe scope
of Ihe _ _ lion _
necessary as a _
oflhe 00I!IIII0Ii ~ should be fully explained Ie Ihe clients at
1IIe 0tlI$a1 of the repJ1!iIIIfItII. See Rule 12((;).

to the above 1ImIIaIIons, aad't dIenI In the CCIIIImOII replU8nlallon hall Ihe tight 10 loyal and dIIIpnI
~ and Ihe protecIori of Rule 1.9 oonceming Ihe obligations 10 a former cIIim!. The dIenI alSO hall Ihe IIgIIt to
dIscIlIIIga the lawyer as a1a1ad In Rule 1.16.

[33) SIIbjed
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•

September 19.2009
Page8of9

•

Otglllll:tatlona Chntt

1341 A lawyer who ~ a corporaIIon Of otIIet organlallon dae$ no!. by virtue of \bat ~ -.rIIy

f8PA1Nnt any constillJenl Of aIIIIia1ed organIaIIon, oucII 11& a peren! or subeIdlaIy. See Rule 1.13(1). TbIIs.!he lawyer
lor an organlallon 1$ no! bCmld from ICOepIl/!O tepnlgenta1loll acIvenIe !D an aIIIliate in an IlIII'llIaIed mailer. unIes$ lie
~ ... oucII \bat !he aftiIiaIe shoufd also be ~ a client of !he lawyer. IherII 1$ an UIldemandiIIO
between !he lawyer and !he orgatllD!lcnal client \bat Ill. lawyer wIIi aWIId tepnIgentaIIoII acIvenIe 10 the CIIIetIt'lI aiIIIiIIes,
Of the Iawyer'a obIIgaIIons 10 eIIher !he ~ client Of the new client ani IikIIIy 10 limit maIet!aIly the Iawyer'a
tepnIgentaIIoII of the other dIent.

[35} A lawyer lor a COIpOI'dOn Of otIIet organIaIIon who Is also a membet of /IS bo8nI of dItIIt:IOfS shoufd deIermII'Ie
_
the recponsIbIIIlIe of the two roles may conftict The lawyer may be caIed 01\ to _
the corporaIIon in
_
irwoMnQ - . of lie dI!edors. ConsideI'aIIon shoufd be glven to lie fnIquencoy with which such sIIuationa may
arise. the poIentIaIlnIensIIy of the conftict. the eIfecI of the Iawyer'a reaiIInaIIon from lie I>oanI and tile ~ of lie
COIpOI'dOn'a obtaining legal advice from another lawyer In such SIIuaIIons. If lie.. Is materIIII- risk \bat the dwllOIo will
compromise lie lawye(s Independence of profes;slonaI ju<IgmenI. !he lawyer should not SlIM! as a diA>cIor or shoufd
cease to act as the COIpOI'dOn's lawyer """"' c:cnlIIdII of i n _ arise. The lawyer shoufd _
!he other ..-.", of
!he bCanI \bat In some ~ mattera dlscussed at bCanI meeIIngs WhIle !he lawyer 1$ pnasenlin lie capadIy of
dIredor might no! be proIactad by !he atlDmey-dient privilege and \bat <XlI'lflIcI of ~ ~ might require lie
lawyer's reoosalll& II dIredor Of migllll'llq1Jll& !he lawyer and the Iawyer'a firm 10 cIecIimI ~ of !he corporaIIon
In a mailer.
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&ptRnbtJr 19, 2009
Page90f9

•

WAIVER O'r CO'NJ'LICf O'r INTEREST

r have rud the foregoing letter dated September 19, 2009 and the foregoing ethics Rule
1.1. I undemand the nature and extent of the contlict of interest that Soiniger Law
Offieos. P.A. baa in regard to the attorney fee issue in my worker's compensation case
titled Kubn v. Mercy MedlcoJ Center.

r understand that it is against my financial interest in the IIDIOUDt of no less than $3301.72
to support their claim for attorney fees. I Iatowingly and vohmtarily elect to waive the
oonfIict of interest.
I understand that I have no obligadoo to waive the contlict of interest or to sign an
affidavit supporting the claim ofSeinlger Law Offices, P.A. for attorney's fees.

I have bad an opportunity to discuss this issue with Seiniger Law Oftlces, P.A. to my
satisfaction. I also undmtam:I that 1 have the right to CODSUIt with separate legal counsel
before signina this waiver or before signing any affidavit.

Date

Q/U/o9
I

,2009.

~u~~~~

Lame Kulm

~qO f1u&tytwaY..tk a~J JZklr~_.Ii..1 JJJ.! i7!;O$"
Acidress

(6"05)
Phone

JJf1H-ofc.(Ca

942 W. MlIlI.11.P. Snmrr
BoiSB, lDAIiO 83102

(208) 345-1000
Fax: (lOS) 345-4700

/D3
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. OASIS LEGAL., 2012 WL 369798 (2012)

Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C. v. Guerdon Enterprises, L.L.C

2012 WL 369798 (Idaho Ind.Com.)
Industrial Commission
State of Idaho

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

v.
OASIS LEGAL FINANCE, L.L.C., REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, DEFENDANT
BRET TYLINSKI, CLAIMANT

v.
GUERDON ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., EMPLOYER
AND
STATE INSURANCE FUND, SURETY, DEFENDANTS
JONATHON GOULD, CLAIMANT

v.
ORMOND BUILDERS, INC., EMPLOYER
AND
STATEINSURANCEFUND,SURETY,DEFENDANTS
TERRY DENNY, CLAIMANT

v.
URS, EMPLOYER
AND
INSURANCE CO. OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, SURETY,
DEFENDANTS
IC:2007-028248, 1998-038640,2005-506894,2007-024933,2008-017154,2009017004
January 13,2012
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
INTRODUCTION
*1 By Order dated January 26,2011, Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., ("Oasis") was ordered
to show cause why certain legal funding contracts between Oasis, and two Idaho
Workers' Compensation Claimants, Bret Tylinski and Jonathan Gould, should not be
found to be invalid under the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws. Subsequent thereto,
the Commission was presented with a proposed lump sum settlement in the case of Terry
Denny v. URS, for review and approval. That agreement anticipated a payment from the
proceeds of the lump sum settlement to Oasis, in satisfaction of another legal funding
contract. The Industrial Commission consolidated the three matters for the purposes of a
show cause proceeding held on November 3, 2011 at Boise, Idaho. Present for Oasis was
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R. Daniel Bowen, Esq., of Boise, Idaho, and William M. McErlean, Esq., of Chicago,
Illinois. At hearing, the testimony of Lisa Foreman, General Counsel for Oasis, was
taken. Oasis offered Exhibits 1 - 15, which were admitted into evidence. The prehearing
deposition of James Arnold was also admitted into evidence. In addition to the foregoing,
the Commission takes judicial notice of its own legal files on each of the three matters
consolidated for purposes of the show cause proceeding.
Oasis submitted a post-hearing brief and the matter came under advisement on December
5, 2011. Being fully apprised in the law and the premises, the Commission issues the
to the
following decision regarding the applicability of the provisions of
Oasis purchase agreements.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Gould v. Ormond Builders, Inc.
1. Jonathan Gould suffered a work related injury on or about May 22, 2008. His timely
claim was accepted by Surety, and workers' compensation benefits were paid to
Claimant, or on his behalf, for the effects of the injury. The parties disputed the extent
and degree of both Claimant's impairment and disability in excess of impairment. These
and other disputes were resolved via a lump sum settlement approved by the Industrial
Commission on or about September 2, 2010. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, it
was anticipated that Claimant would receive $32,391.50 lump sum consideration. The
Commission approved attorney's fees in amount of $8,097.88, and costs in the amount of
$1,000.00. Per the terms of the agreement, it was anticipated that Claimant would net
$23,293.62 after the payment of attorney's fees and costs. On or about September 9,
2010, the Industrial Commission was contacted by Claimant who had questions about
additional funds withheld from the settlement. An inquiry from the Industrial
Commission revealed that following approval of the lump sum settlement agreement,
Surety contacted the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to ascertain whether or not
a child support withholding order was in effect. Upon being advised of the settlement, the
Department of Health and Welfare immediately issued a withholding order and delivered
the same to Surety. Surety deducted the sum of $11,646.81 from the settlement amount
for payment to the Department of Health and Welfare in satisfaction of the withholding
order. Surety then forwarded a check in the amount of $20,744.69, ($32,391.50 $11,646.81) to Claimant's counsel.
*2 2. The Commission also learned that an additional payment had been made directly
from counsel's client trust account to an entity identified as Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C.,
in the amount of $7,461.00. Claimant's counsel explained that this payment was made to
satisfy Claimant's obligation under the terms of an agreement he had previously made
with Oasis. After deductions for costs and attorney's fees approved by the Commission,
the valid child support order, and the payment to Oasis, Claimant netted $4,185.81 from
the original settlement of $32,391.50.
3. At the request of the Commission, counsel provided the Commission with a copy of an
Oasis "Purchase Agreement" executed by Claimant on June 16, 2009, pursuant to the
terms of which he received the immediate payment of $3,650.00. The agreement
APPENDIX
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describes the transaction as follows:
Seller [Gould] sells all of Seller's interest in and to the Purchased Interest to Purchaser
[Oasis], and Purchaser purchases the Purchased Interest from Seller on the terms and
conditions provided in this Purchase Agreement. The purchase of the Purchased Interest
shall entitle Purchaser to receive the Oasis Ownership Amount ... As consideration for the
sale of the Purchased Interest, Purchasers shall pay the Purchase Price to Seller ... "
Oasis Ex. 8, p. 55.
4. The terms "Purchased Interest" and "Oasis Ownership Amount," are defined as
follows:
"Oasis Ownership Amount" is the amount Purchaser is to be paid out of the Proceeds and
as determined as of the date Purchaser receives payment based on the Payment Schedule
on Page 1 of this Purchase Agreement.

"Purchased Interest" means the right to receive a portion of the Proceeds equal to the
Oasis Ownership Amount on the further terms and conditions provided for in this
Purchase Agreement.
§§ 1.2 and 1.4, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 56.

Therefore, the interest that Oasis purchased for the sum of $3,650.00 is its right to
recover from the proceeds of the workers' compensation case the "Oasis Ownership
Amount," an amount which equals the original purchase price plus an additional amount
that increases with the passage of time. Per the Gould agreement, the Oasis ownership
amount payable to Oasis at any particular time is described in the payment schedule:
Payment Schedule

Oasis Ownership Amount
Oasis Ownership Amount: (Payoff
Amount)

June 16,2009 to December 15,2009

$5,475.00

December 16,2009 to June 15,2010

$6,022.50

June 16,2010 to September 15,2010

$8,212.50

September 16, 2010 to December 15, 2010

$9,125.00

December 16,2010 to June 15,2011

$10,057.50

June 16, 2011 to December 15, 2011

$11,862.50
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December 16, 2011 and thereafter

$12,775.00

Fees Due at Repayment:
Case Servicing Fee every 6 months

$20.00

Subsequent Case Review for each additional $20.00
funding
Facsimile and Photocopying Costs per
Funding

$ 9.00

*3 Oasis Ex. 8, p. 55
5. The purchase agreement further specifies that the Oasis ownership amount shall be
determined as of the date Oasis receives payment in full from or on behalf of seller.
Importantly, the agreement specifies that seller is not entitled to receive any proceeds
from the workers' compensation claimant until Oasis has received the Oasis ownership
amount. (See, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 58). To this end, Oasis required both Gould, and his
attorney, to execute an "irrevocable letter of direction" contemporaneous with the
execution of the purchase agreement. Pursuant to the terms of irrevocable letter of
direction, both Claimant and his attorney acknowledge and agree that the Oasis
ownership amount is to be paid from the proceeds of any settlement of the workers'
compensation claim before any funds are released to Claimant. The letter further
anticipates that any settlement monies paid by Employer/Surety will be paid by check to
Claimant's attorney, and that all disbursements of funds will be made through the
attorney's client trust account. (See, Oasis Ex. 10, p. 64).
6. The purchase agreement also makes it clear that in the event Gould takes nothing on
his underlying worker's compensation claim, he has no obligation to pay the Oasis
ownership amount.
7. Notwithstanding that the payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount bears
some similarities to the repayment of the principal amount of a loan, plus interest thereon,
the agreement goes to some length to dispel any notion that the transaction should be
construed as a loan versus a purchase and sale:
Risk of Loss; No Loan Transaction. The purchase of the Purchased Interest and the other
transactions contemplated by this Purchase Agreement involve a substantial economic
risk and a bona fide risk of loss to Purchaser. The Oasis Ownership Amount has been
negotiated to account for such risk. The sale of the Purchased Interest is an absolute sale
and not a loan secured by a collateral assignment of the Purchased Interest.
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Treatment of Transaction. Seller agrees to treat and report this sale and purchase of the
Purchased Interest as a sale transaction and not as a loan for all purposes (including tax
purposes).

Treatment in Bankruptcy. If Seller commences or has commenced against it any case or
other proceeding pursuant to any bankruptcy, insolvency or similar law prior to payment
of the full Oasis Ownership Amount to Purchaser, Seller shall cause the Purchased
Interest to be described as an asset of Purchaser (and not as a debt obligation of Seller) in
any oral or written communications, including, without limitation, any schedule or other
document filed in connection with such case or proceeding.
§§ 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 57.

8. As of the date of settlement of the underlying workers' compensation claim, the
payment schedule specifies that Oasis was entitled to collect the sum of $8,212.50.
However, through the efforts of Claimant's counsel, and with the agreement of Oasis,
that sum was reduced to $7,461.00.
*4 9. On learning of the existence of the purchase agreement, and in view of the direct
payment to Oasis from counsel's client trust account in the amount of $7,461.00 from the
proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the Commission filed its timely notice of
reconsideration of the lump sum settlement agreement pursuant to the provisions
~~,,"' Under that section, the Commission is empowered to reconsider its decision to
approve the lump sum settlement agreement on its own initiative. Reconsideration of the
approval of the settlement was thought necessary because of concerns over the legality of
the payment to Oasis under the provisions
10. Following notice to the parties, the Commission held a hearing in Idaho Falls on
November 30, 2010, for the purpose of obtaining additional information concerning the
nature of Claimant's agreement with Oasis, Mr. Wetzel's involvement in the transaction,
and the manner of the disbursement of funds. A copy of the transcript of those
proceedings has been offered into evidence as Oasis Exhibit 2.
11. Many of the Commission's concerns over the legality of the $7,461.00 payment could
not be adequately addressed by the parties in attendance at the November 30, 2010
hearing. In furtherance of its duties to administer the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws,
and pursuant to
the Commission is empowered to make such inquiries
and investigations as may be necessary to assure the proper administration of the
Workers' Compensation laws of this state. The Commission ordered Oasis to appear and
show cause why the Commission should not enter an order finding that the payment
made from counsel's client trust account in satisfaction of the June 16, 2009 purchase
agreement is illegal under the Workers' Compensation laws of this state, and further
requiring Oasis to return the sum of $7,461.00 to Claimant.

Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises
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12. On or about August 10, 2007, Bret Tylinski suffered an accident/injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment. The claim was accepted by the Workers'
Compensation Surety, and benefits were paid to Tylinksi, or on his behalf.
13. As did Gould, Tylinksi sold the right to a portion of the proceeds of his workers'
compensation settlement to Oasis. Tylinki's case, however, involves two purchase
agreements. The first agreement was made on or about December 20, 2008, pursuant to
the terms of which Tylinksi agreed to sell his interest in a portion of the proceeds of any
subsequent recovery on his workers' compensation claim to Oasis for the sum of
$1,050.00. The Oasis ownership amounts and the payment schedule differed from the
payment schedule at issue in Gould, because of the lower purchase price. In connection
with the December 20, 2008 purchase agreement, the following payment schedule
applies:
Oasis Ownership Amount

Payment Schedule

Oasis Ownership Amount (Payoff
Amount)

December 19,2008 to June 18,2009

$1,575.00

June 19,2009 to December 18, 2009

$1,732.50

December 19, 2009 to March 18, 2010

$2,362.50

March 19,2010 to June 18,2010

$2,625.00

June 19,2010 to December 18,2010

$2,887.50

December 19,2010 to June 18,2011

$3,412.50

June 19,2011 and thereafter

$3,675.00

*5 Oasis Ex. 3, p 36.
14. On or about January 5, 2009, Tylinksi entered into a second purchase agreement with
Oasis, under the terms of which Claimant received $550.00 consideration from Oasis in
exchange for Oasis' purchase of an interest in the proceeds of any subsequent workers'
compensation settlement. The payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount for this
purchase is set forth in the agreement as follows:
Oasis Ownership Amount

Payment Schedule

Oasis Ownership Amount (Payoff
Amount)
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December 31, 2008 to June 29, 2009

$825.00

June 30, 2009 to December 30,2009

$907.50

December 31, 2009 to March 30, 2010

$1,237.50

March 31, 2010 to June 29, 2010

$1,375.00

June 30, 2010 to December 30, 2010

$1,512.50

December 31,2010 to June 29, 2011

$1,787.50

June 30, 2011 and thereafter

$1,925.00

Oasis Ex. 6, p. 46.
15. The purchase agreements at issue in the Tylinski matter are substantially similar to
the agreement at issue in Gould. However, the Gould agreement contains the following
provision:
No Assignment. The parties agree and affirm that this contract does not represent an
assignment of workers compensation benefits as defined under state law.

See, § 6.6, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 59.
The Tylinski agreements are bereft of this "no assignment" language.
16. As did Gould, Tylinski and his attorney executed two irrevocable letters of direction.
17. On or about November 5,2010, Tylinski submitted a proposed lump sum settlement
agreement for review and approval by the Industrial Commission, under the terms of
which Tylinski would receive $18,000.00 in settlement of his claims. After deduction of
attorney's fees and costs of suit, Claimant was expected to net $11,226.00.
18. Although not disclosed in the lump sum settlement agreement, the Memorandum of
Attorney's Fees and Costs submitted by Claimant's counsel reveals that counsel expected
to pay, from the proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the sum of $4,945.00 to Oasis. On
or about December 9, 2010, the Commission entered its order approving the lump sum
settlement in part, but requiring Claimant's counsel to retain the sum of $5,220.00 from
the proceeds of the settlement, representing the amount that would be payable to Oasis if
paid subsequent to January 6, 2011, but prior to June 19, 2011. Counsel was ordered to
hold this sum in trust, pending further order from the Commission on the validity of the
contract between Ty lin ski and Oasis.

Terry Denny v. URS
19. At all times relevant hereto, Terry Denny was employed by URS. On June 29 or June
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30, 2009, Denny suffered an accident/injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment with Employer. The claim was accepted by Employer/Surety, and workers'
compensation benefits were paid to Denny or on his behalf.
20. On or about September 9,2010, Denny entered into a purchase agreement with Oasis,
under the terms of which he was paid the sum of $5,150.00 in consideration of Oasis'
receipt of an interest in the proceeds of any future recovery made by Denny in connection
with his worker's compensation claim. The purchase agreement specifies the following
payment schedule of the Oasis ownership amount:

Payment Schedule

Oasis Ownership Amount
Oasis Ownership Amount (Payoff
Amount)

September 9,2010 to March 8, 2011

$7,725.00

March 9, 2011 to September 8, 2011

$8,497.50

September 9,2011 to December 8,2011

$11,587.50

December 9,2011 to March 8, 2012

$12,875.00

March 9, 2012 to September 8, 2012

$14,162.50

September 9,2012 to March 8, 2013

$16,737.50

March 9, 2013 and thereafter

$18,025.00

Fees Due at Payment
Case Servicing Fee every 6 months

$30

Subsequent Case Review for each additional
funding

$20

Facsimile and Photocopying Costs per
Funding

$25

*6 21. The terms of the Denny purchase agreement are substantially similar to those at
issue in both the Gould and Tylinski transactions. However, the Denny "no assignment"
language differs slightly from the language used in the Gould contract. In this regard, the
Denny agreement specifies:
No Assignment of Workers Compensation Benefits. The Parties agree and affirm that
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this contract does not represent an assignment as defined under state law.
§ 5.8, Denny Purchase Agreement.
22. On or about April 8, 2011, Denny and Employer/Surety presented a proposed lump
sum settlement to the Commission for review and approval, under the terms of which
Claimant would receive $20,000.00 new money. The explanatory attorney fee letter
submitted by Fred Lewis, Claimant's counsel, reflects that as of Apri118, 2011, the Oasis
ownership amount was approximately $7,800.00. By Order filed April 25, 2011, the
Industrial Commission approved the proposed lump sum settlement agreement, except
that the Commission ordered counsel to hold the sum of $7,724.25, representing the
Oasis ownership amount, in trust, pending the Commission's determination of the
validity of the purchase agreement between Denny and Oasis.
23. Following the issuance of the Industrial Commission's January 26, 2011 Order to
Show Cause in the Gould matter, the Commission entered its May 18, 2011 Order
consolidating the Tylinski, Gould and Denny matters for purposes of the Order to Show
Cause hearing.
24. Preparatory to hearing, the hearing testimony of James Arnold was taken by way of
prehearing deposition.
25. James Arnold is an attorney practicing in eastern Idaho. His practice involves
primarily the representation of injured workers before the Idaho Industrial Commission.
26. He testified that approximately five years ago he became aware of the existence of
Oasis, and other legal financing companies whose business model involved the "loan of
monies to injured workers against the anticipated recovery in a personal injury or
workers' compensation action." He testified that he was initially very leery of these
companies since the money "loaned" to the injured worker was very expensive. However,
he testified that as his experience with Oasis increased, he found the company easy to
work with, and willing to negotiate what the company would accept in satisfaction of the
Oasis ownership amount. Mr. Arnold testified that because of the expensive nature of the
Oasis money, he attempts to persuade clients to utilize Oasis' services only as a last
resort, i.e. after his clients have exhausted more conventional, and cheaper, loan
opportunities.
27. Mr. Arnold testified that he has no business relationship with Oasis, and that he has
never received a client referral from Oasis.
28. Mr. Arnold testified that Oasis does vet the cases of injured workers who offer to sell
an interest in the proceeds of their workers' compensation claim to Oasis. He testified
that Oasis is ordinarily reluctant to provide money in cases where liability is disputed.
However, he noted that in the cases where this has become an issue, he has persuaded
Oasis to complete the transaction because of his representations about the strength of a
particular case. He stated that as he developed a relationship with Oasis, the vetting of
cases with Oasis became easier as the company developed confidence in Mr. Arnold's
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ability to evaluate cases.
*7 29. Finally, Mr. Arnold testified that in spite of the expensive nature of the Oasis
money, the company fills a real need in the Idaho Workers' Compensation system.
Where $3,000 or $5,000 means the difference between being evicted from one's
apartment, or missing a mortgage payment, during the pendency of a workers'
compensation claim, it is worth obtaining money from Oasis, when all other resources
have been exhausted.
30. Lisa Foreman is General Counsel for Oasis. She is licensed to practice law in the state
of Illinois, and has been employed by Oasis since September 2005. Her job
responsibilities include oversight of litigation in which the company is involved. As well,
she assists with the company's regulatory initiatives nationwide. She testified that the
business model utilized to purchase interests in the proceeds of workers' compensation
claims is used in 45 states inclusive of Idaho. In five states, Oasis has either chosen not to
do business, or is prohibited from following this business model by applicable law.
31. Ms. Foreman testified that the Oasis purchase agreement was drafted so as not to
conflict with non-assignment statutes similar to I.e. § 72-802. Specifically, she testified
that although the purchase agreement may involve an "assignment," the assignment
anticipated by the agreement is not the prohibited assignment of a workers' compensation
"claim." Rather per Ms. Foreman, the purchase agreement anticipates the assignment of
a contingent interest in the proceeds of a workers compensation settlement. If the
purchase agreement was intended to effectuate the assignment of the injured worker's
claim, then one would expect Oasis to be the only entity which could prosecute the claim
following the assignment. Clearly, the purchase agreement does not anticipate that
anyone but claimant can prosecute the claim. The only assignment which Ms. Foreman
would concede might be anticipated by the language of the purchase agreement is the
assignment of a contingent interest in the proceeds of the workers' compensation
settlement. Per Oasis when it comes to applying the language of I. . § 72-8 2, there is a
reru and significant difference between the assignment of a workers compensation claim
and the assignment of the proceeds of a workers compensation claim. The former is
prohibited, the latter is not.
32. Although the purchase agreement bears some similarities to a loan transaction, neither
would Ms. Foreman concede that the agreement should be treated as a loan. In the main,
her argument is that a true loan creates an obligation for the repayment of a debt certain,
whereas the Oasis purchase agreement creates an obligation only upon the occurrence of
certain contingencies, including, inter alia, claimant's receipt of an award or settlement
of some type following the prosecution or settlement of his claim
33. For the same reason, Ms. Foreman argued that neither does the Oasis purchase
agreement create a creditor/debtor relationship. Importantly, however, Ms. Foreman
acknowledged that at some point in the course of an Oasis transaction with an injured
worker, the relationship might mature into one of a creditor and a debtor. If a settlement
is obtained, and if there is money remaining in the attorney's client trust account
following the payment of medical bills and attorney's fees, then Oasis may become a
V:t''',tl(w'/Ne;.:t,~)
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creditor with respect to the proceeds of settlement owed to Oasis per the purchase
agreement. (See, Hr. Tr., 16/18-18/14).
*8 34. Confirming Mr. Arnold's testimony, Ms. Foreman acknowledged that the Oasis
money is "expensive," but that Oasis purchase agreements fill a need that goes largely
unfilled among a sizeable minority of the population of workers' compensation
claimants; without Oasis type purchase agreements, such claimants would be unable to
bridge the financial abyss that lies between the curtailment of workers' compensation
benefits and the resolution of the workers' compensation claim. Ms. Foreman explained
that Oasis is not as draconian as might be suggested by the repayment schedules
described above. Oasis frequently agrees to a reduction of the repayment amount
depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
35. During the pendency of the Commission's consideration of this matter, Oasis has
agreed to freeze the payment schedule for each of the three cases at issue in this
proceeding.
ISSUES
The following matters are at issue:
1. Whether there is an actual controversy which warrants the Commission's review of the
application
to the Oasis contracts;
2. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to consider the legality of the
Oasis purchase agreements under ~~~~~,
3. Whether the Oasis purchase agreements violated the provision of~:..:-;:t--'-'='--=~.
a. Whether the Oasis purchase agreement is a prohibited assignment of a workers'
compensation claim;
b. Whether Oasis is a "creditor," and if so, whether the settlement amounts paid
following the approval of the lump sum settlement agreements at issue constitute
"compensation" not subject to the claim of a creditor.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

I.
1. As Oasis has noted, the record is bereft of evidence that any of the Claimants in this
consolidated proceeding take the position that Oasis is not entitled to recover the Oasis
ownership amount following the settlement of their respective workers' compensation
claims. Indeed, although it was Mr. Gould's inquiry concerning the propriety of the
payment of the Oasis ownership amount from his attorney's client trust account that
alerted the Commission to these practices and initiated the instant inquiry, Mr. Gould
testified that although he and his attorney considered whether to dispute the Oasis claim
to a portion of the proceeds of settlement, he ultimately decided that the indebtedness he
had voluntarily incurred should be paid. Mr. Gould testified that even if the settlement
proceeds in question had been paid directly to him, and contrary to the irrevocable letter
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of direction, he would nevertheless pay Oasis what he owed. Although it can be supposed
that one or more of the Claimants in these matters might find a use for the monies that are
in dispute, none of the Claimants have voiced opposition to the agreements they
executed. However, we do not feel that in the absence of a challenge to the provisions of
the purchase agreement by one or more of the Claimants, we are prohibited from
considering whether or not the Oasis purchase agreements are invalid under ~~~"*9 2. First, these matters arise under the statutory responsibilities created by ~'-'--"'--'-"=In full, that section provides:
Lump sum payments. Whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interest
of all parties, the liability of the employer for compensation may, on application to the
commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or in part by the payment of
one or more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the commission.
3. Therefore, it matters not that the parties have provisionally settled their disputes unless
the Commission, too, can be satisfied that the settlements are in the best interest of the
parties. The fact that none of the Claimants in these proceedings have seen fit to
challenge the propriety of the Oasis purchase agreements informs, but does not govern,
the Commission's inquiry into whether or not these settlements are in the best interest of
the parties. Indeed, were we to adopt Oasis' reasoning, the Commission would never be
able to consider whether or not a proposed settlement is in the best interest of the parties
since the parties, having provisionally settled their disputes, can no longer be said to have
matters in controversy.
4. In summary,
vests the Commission with the responsibility to ascertain
whether the proposed lump sum settlements are in the best interest of the parties. Part and
parcel of that determination is the Commission's assessment of whether or not the
bar Oasis from access to the proceeds of settlement. In each
provisions of
of the three cases referenced above, the Commission still has before it for consideration
whether the lump sum settlement agreement should be approved. Therefore,
notwithstanding that the parties are in apparent agreement concerning the disposition of
the proceeds of settlement, the Commission's inquiries concerning the proposed
settlement are not only appropriate, but required.

II.
5. Oasis also challenges the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction to review the propriety
of the purchase agreements between Oasis and the Claimants, and each of them. Under
~--"-'--'-='-'-~, the Commission has jurisdiction to consider all questions arising under the
Workers' Compensation laws of this state. See, ~~="--"~=~~~~-==~~"-'~~~"--'.~,

the Commission has the responsibility to approve
lump sum settlement agreements and, in so doing, must determine that the settlement is in
the best interest of the parties. It necessarily follows that the Commission has jurisdiction
to clarify claimant's rights under the lump sum settlement agreement that is presented to
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the Commission for approval. See, Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, supra. It is also
worth noting that the statutory provision which may invalidate the Oasis purchase
agreement is a statute specific to the Workers' Compensation laws, and the Commission
clearly has jurisdiction to consider whether one of the provisions of the statutory scheme
it administers affects Oasis' claim to the proceeds of a workers' compensation settlement.
*10 6. For these reasons, the Commission rejects Oasis' assertion that it does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. The questions before the Commission
are clearly questions arising under the Workers' Compensation laws of this state.

III.
I.e. § 72-802 provides:
Compensation not assignable - Exempt from execution. No claims for compensation
under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the
worker's compensation laws of any other state, shall be assignable, and all compensation
and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, except the restrictions
under this section shall not apply to enforcement of an order of any court for the support
of any person by execution, garnishment or wage withholding under chapter 12, title 7,
Idaho Code.
7. This statute, and similar provisions found under the laws of other states, appears, at
first blush, to bar two types of actions. First, the statute prohibits the assignment of
claims. Second, the statute prohibits the claims of creditors against compensation and
claims therefor. With respect to the statutory prohibition against the assignment of
claims, Oasis acknowledges that an assignment took place. However, it argues that the
assignment was not a prohibited assignment of a claim. Rather the as ignment made by
each of the thre Claimants to Oasis is of a non-prohjbited type- the assignment made by
the Claimants was of a contingent right to the proceeds of a workers compensation
settlement. Oasis argues that had the Idaho legislature intended to prohibit this type of
assignment, the statute would have so stated. In other words, the legislature would have
prohibited not only the assignment of "claims for compensation," but also the assignment
of "compensation." This argument, according to Oasis, finds its best support in the fact
that the prohibition applicable to creditors applies not only to "claims for compensation,"
but to "compensation" as well. The argument is that the legislature clearly appreciated a
distinction between compensation and claims therefor in connection with the prohibition
against the claims of creditors, and it must therefore be presumed that it understood the
significance of prohibiting the assignment of only "claims for compensation," instead of
"claims for compensation" and "compensation." This argument has found good traction
in several jurisdictions.
8. In Kentuckv Employers ' lvil/Ilial Insurance v. Nova'ion Capital, LLC 201 1 W.L.
832316 (K v. Ct. App. Februarv 25. 20 II) claimant entered into a settlement of his
workers' compensation case under the terms of which he would receive $400 per week
for 70 weeks, one lump sum payment of $150,000 and $486 for 520 weeks. Thereafter,
claimant entered into an agreement with Novation Capital, pursuant to the terms of which
US Governrnent Work s

APPENDIX
Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C. v. Guerdon Enterprises, L.L.C

- [XXIII] -

claimant assigned his right to the proceeds of his structured settlement in exchange for a
lump sum of $112,952.
*11 The workers' compensation surety objected to the agreement, arguing that it violated
the anti-assignment provisions of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation laws, which
provided in pertinent part:
[n]o claim for compensation under this chapter shall be assignable, except court or
administratively ordered child support pursuant to
All compensation and
claims therefor, except child support obligations, shall be exempt from all claims of
creditors.

Noting the general rule that courts are required to construe words and phrases according
to their usual, ordinary and every day meaning, the court rejected the surety's challenge,
reasoning that by its express language the statute only prohibited the assignment of
"claims," not the assignment of "compensation." Supporting this conclusion was the
court's analysis of the broader language prohibiting the claims of creditors. In this regard,
the court stated:
Significantly, the second sentence of the statute distinguishes claims and compensation.
As pointed out by the circuit court in its thoughtful analysis, had the General Assembly
intended to prohibit the assignment of an award or settlement, it could have simply
included language expressing such intent. Based on similar facts, the Kentucky Supreme
Court reached the same result.
In Newberg, the injured employee and his employer entered into a settlement agreement
that provided for reimbursement by the Special Fund for amounts determined to be the
responsibility of the Fund but paid by the employer pursuant to the terms of the
agreement.
9. In Rapid Settlements LTD's Application for Approval of Structured Settlement
Payment Rights v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company, 133 Wash. Ct. App. 350,
~"'-'-=-::''-'-'=-~=':;:'..L' North Carolina resident Hargette was the beneficiary of a structured
settlement in a North Carolina workers' compensation case. To fund the settlement
payments, employer/surety purchased an annuity from Symetra Life Insurance Company.
The settlement agreement and the annuity contract prohibited Hargette from assigning his
right to payment. Time passed, and at some point, Hargette arranged to give up his right
to some of his future periodic payments to Rapid Settlements LTD, in exchange for a
lump sum payment. As required by Washington law, Rapid notified Symetra and sought
court approval over Symetra's objection.

In addition to arguing that the annuity contract itself prohibited the assignment of the
right to periodic payments, Symetra argued that applicable North Carolina Workers'
Compensation law also prohibited the assignment by Hargette of his right to receive
periodic payments under the annuity contract. In particular, North Carolina law provided:
No claim for compensation under this Article shall be assignable, and all compensation
and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from taxes.
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To this argument, Rapid responded that by its specific language, the North Carolina Act
bars assignment only of "claims for compensation," not the right to payments achieved
by the settlement of such claims.
*12 10. The Washington court ruled that the phrase "all compensation and claims
therefor" clearly expressed an intention on the part of the North Carolina legislature to
distinguish between claims for compensation and compensation itself. Had North
Carolina intended to bar assignment of compensation itself, the statute would have been
worded differently. For example, North Carolina could have stated the statutory
prohibition against assignments as follows, had it wished to prohibit both the assignment
of claims and compensation therefor:
No compensation and no claims for compensation under this article shall be assignable,
and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and
from taxes.
11. The statutory language at issue in both cases discussed above is similar, but not
identical, to the Idaho statutory scheme. In connection with the issue currently before the
Industrial Commission, the language of the statute prohibiting the assignment of claims
bears closer examination. Following the 2009 amendment to
the section of
the statute dealing with the prohibited assignments reads as follows:
Compensation not assignable - exempt from execution. No claims for compensation
under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the
workers' compensation laws of any other state shall be assignable ...
12. It is immediately apparent that the non-assignment provisions of ~:..:...-"---'-=-=-"-'=.,
though similar to the statutes at issue in the Kentucky and Washington cases discussed
above, contains some significant differences. Against the suggestion that Idaho too is
among those jurisdictions which distinguish between the assignment of claims and the
assignment of compensation there are two components of the statutory language which
suggest otherwise. First, the title of the statute plainly states that compensation [is] not
assignable. Anticipating the need to reconcile this language with the interpretation it
promotes, Oasis argues that the title of the statute must be ignored where it conflicts with
the unambiguous direction of the body of the statute. In other words, Oasis argues that
the title of the statute cannot be used to create an ambiguity where none otherwise exists.
Cited in support of this proposition are "-""'=-='-'-"'--=-:-'-=~-'-'-"-'--'-"--"'=-"'-.!-'-'="'-'--"=-"---''--'''-'=
-'-"--'-'-'==-'-"-''-'-"--'-'-~=-=--'''-'--'--1.=''-~' and Sf at e v. Pete rso n . 14 I I dah 0 473. I I I P. 3d 158
~'-"--'..L.' In Peterson, the court ruled that although the title is a part of the statute, it may
not be used as a means of creating an ambiguity when the body of the act itself is clear.
We believe that Oasis has correctly apprehended Idaho's adoption of this general rule of
statutory construction. However as developed below we al believe that the body of the
statute is not without ambiguity thus making it appropriate to consider the title of the
tatute along with the language of the statute itself to infer the legislature s intentions.
*13 13. As noted, the statute ostensibly prohibits only the assignment of claims, while
protecting both claims and compensation from the claims of creditors. However, it is
important to recognize that in the section of the statute prohibiting the assignment of
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claims, the 2009 amendment to the statute specifies that this prohibition against the
assignment of claims includes "compensation payable" to an Idaho resident under the
workers' compensation laws of another state. Had it been the intent of the legislature to
narrowly define the word "claim" to mean only the assignment of claimant's chose in
action, not to include the proceeds payable as a consequence of the successful
prosecution of that claim, then the amendment would have been stated differently, or
incorporated elsewhere in the statute. To be consistent with the construction urged upon
the Commission by Oasis, the statute could have been written as follows:
No claims for compensation under this law, including claims for compensation payable to
a resident ofthis state under the workers' compensation laws of any other state ...
As well, to give effect to the construction urged by Oasis, the 2009 amendment could
have been inserted at a different place in the statute:
No claims for compensation under this law shall be assignable, and all compensation and
claims therefor, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the
workers' compensation laws of any other state, shall be exempt from all claims of
creditors ...
14. Instead, the amendment makes it clear that "claims," which term includes
compensation payable to an Idaho claimant under the workers' compensation laws of
some other state, are not assignable. This structure strongly sugge ts that the legislature s
us of the tenn claim was intended to include not only a prohibition against the
assignment of the cause of action, but also a prohibition against the assignment of the
proceeds payable to an injured worker as the result of his or her workers compensation
claim.
15. To th extent that the non-assignment language of the statute is deemed ambiguous
hich is not util ized in this context to create an
we think that the title of the statute
ambiguity, actually lends further support to the proposition that what the legislature
intended was to prohibit both the assignment of claim and proceeds thereof.
16. This reading of I.e. § 72-802 finds support in the recent case of Williams v. Blue
Cross of Idaho, supra. Discussing in the legislature's purpose in adopting I.e. § 72-802,
the court observed:
The purpose behind exempting workers' compensation proceeds from the claims of
creditors is not to allow the injured worker to recover twice for his or her medical
expenses but, rather, to protect the worker and his or her family from the financial
difficulties associated with the worker's injury.
"Workers' compensation awards are intended not to make the worker rich, but to keep an
injured worker and the worker's family from becoming destitute because the breadwinner
has been injured and cannot work. In order to protect this award and further this policy,
workers' compensation statutes typically provide that these awards cannot be attached by
creditors. Moreover, they provide that the worker cannot voluntarily assign the proceeds,
primarily in order to ensure that injured workers who may have a valid claim but have not
U S Government Work s
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yet received the first payments and are desperate for cash do not sell their rights at fire
sale prices." ~~~~~~==.!.~~~~~~~==~=~~~~L.J,c:.~::'=~~

17. The Court paraphrased the ~~-'-=~= prohibitions as follows:
The plain language of
prohibits (1) a workers' compensation claimant from
assigning workers' compensation proceeds to a third party, and (2) a creditor, other than
one seeking to recover child support, from asserting a claim against workers'
compensation proceeds paid to a claimant.
Although the Court was well aware of the specific language used by the legislature in
crafting the provisions of the statute, it nevertheless concluded that the prohibition
against assignment extends to the assignment of workers' compensation proceeds,
exactly what has been attempted in these cases under the Oasis purchase agreement. We
also think it important that the Williams Court made a point of emphasizing that
~~= is intended to protect the injured worker against exactly the type of practice that is
at issue in this matter. By its citation to the ALR 5th Article quoted above, the Court has
is to ensure that injured workers with
recognized that one of the purposes
valid, yet unrecognized, claims, will not sell their rights at "fire sale prices" in order to
keep body and soul together during the pendency of their claim. The Court's explanation
of the legislative purpose underline
precisely anticipates the facts of these
cases.
18. The assignment at issue was an assignment of an expectancy, or a contingent right to
receive workers' compensation benefits. Certainly, at the time of the assignment, these
were rights that had not yet ripened to a certainty. However, the assignment of a
conditional right to something is well recognized under Idaho law. See, =:.:;;.:;..:~-'-!.
~'-'-'~"-'-~~~~~~.

We see nothing in the facts of this case that makes the Oasis
purchase of a contingent right to the proceeds of a workers' compensation claim anything
less than an "assignment" of an expectancy, under Idaho law.

19. We are not unmindful of the fact that the prosecution of a contested workers'
compensation claim is a sometimes protracted affair. We are aware of the fact that it is
not unusual for a typical workers' compensation claimant to be deemed a poor credit risk,
unable to access any of the more traditional, and cheaper, forms of credit available in the
community. We recognize that whatever else might be said about the cost associated with
obtaining money from a legal financing company such as Oasis, these companies fill a
need as lenders of last resort who can provide an injured worker with the means to obtain
what is absolutely necessary to keep a roof over his head, or put food on the table, until
he recognizes something from his workers' compensation claim. We are loathe to deny
the injured workers of this state this last choice, especially when we have nothing to offer
Claimant during the pendency of a litigated claim. However, we believe that the Oasis
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business model, notwithstanding that it is styled as a purchase/sale, nevertheless relies
upon an assignment of a contingent right to workers' compensation benefits. We find,
therefore, that these assignments are invalid under =~~~':'
*15 20. Because we have found that a prohibited assignment of Claimants' rights to
workers' compensation benefits took place, we do not reach the question of whether or
not Oasis is also a creditor who is prohibited from making a claim against compensation,
or claims therefor.
21. Although we have found that the Oasis agreements rely upon a prohibited
assignment, we also recognize that our ruling has the potential to create a windfall to
Gould, Tylinksi and Denny. To prevent unjust enrichment to these Claimants, we believe
that where a Claimant's recovery in an underlying workers' compensation case is
otherwise sufficient to implicate the requirement to pay the Oasis ownership amount, the
equitable solution is to require the injured worker to reimburse Oasis in the amount of the
purchase price originally paid by Oasis to the injured worker at the outset of the
relationship.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
1. The purchase agreement and associated documents executed by Tylinski, Gould and
Denny create assignments of an expectancy in the proceeds of their workers'
compensation claims, which is prohibited under the provisions
However, to prevent unjust enrichment to Tylinksi, Gould and Denny, and to return the
parties, as nearly as possible, to the positions they were in prior to the prohibited
assignments, Tylinksi, Gould and Denny shall each reimburse Oasis in the amount of the
purchase price paid by Oasis under the terms of the purchase agreements at issue;
2. On the Commission's Notice of Reconsideration of the lump sum settlement at issue in
Gould v. Ormond Builders, Oasis is directed to repay to Claimant the sum of $3,811.00,
representing the difference between the negotiated settlement of the Oasis ownership
amount ($7,461.00) and the purchase price originally paid by Oasis ($3,650.00). The
subject lump sum settlement agreement is, in all other respects, approved, per the
Commission's Order of September 2,2010;
3. In the matter of Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises, LLC, and pursuant to the December 9,
2010 Order approving, in part, the lump sum agreement, counsel for Claimant is hereby
ordered to release to Claimant the sum of $3,620, representing the difference between the
amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the direction of the Commission
($5,220.00) and the purchase price paid by Oasis, ($1,600.00). Counsel is directed to
release to Oasis the sum of $1 ,600.00;
4. In the matter of Denny v. URS, and pursuant to the Commission's Order approving, in
part, Stipulation and Agreement for Lump Sum Settlement filed April 25, 2011, counsel
for Claimant is hereby directed to release to Claimant the sum of $2,574.25, representing
the difference between the amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the
direction of the Commission ($7,724.25) and the purchase price paid by Oasis
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($5,150.00). Counsel is directed to release the sum of$5,150.00 to Oasis.
*165. This order is final and conclusive as to all matters decided herein pursuant to
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Thomas E. Limbaugh
Chairman
Thomas P. Baskin
Commissioner
R.D. Maynard
Commissioner
2
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Illustrative Example of Prior Application of "Available Funds" - IDAPA
17.02.08.233.01
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SEINIGER
LAW OFFICES
P"ftsm-l~·

A.NOltEW C. M.WH

1-'1,-,_11_-

March 17,2009
VIA FAX TO 334-2321
Jennifer Poole
Idaho Industrial Commission
Compensation Consultant
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83720-0041

RE:

Cavanagh VI. Sf. Lukes
Date of Injury:
4/0912006
IIC Case No.:
06-004060

Dear Ms. Poole:
Thank you for your correspondence of 3/10/09 requesting more information about the
legal services we provided to Sharon Cavanagh prior to settlement.

Sharon retained this office on June 6, 2006 for several reasons, including her concerns
that her employer (a self-surety) intended to wrongfully discontinue her medical and
other work comp benefits. Here it is in Sharon's own words. (Donna and Mert represent
her employers.)
06-01·2006 I called and talked to Donna to ask if she would let me know

what is going to happen next She asked me ifI'd talked to Mert, I told her
no, she told me to leave another message with Mert. Donna did not give
me any further information. Mert bad left a message that there are
appointments set up with a doctor Beaver, but I don't know who this is or
why. I spoke with Men to get more information about the scheduled MD
appl's and to ask how long my Worker's Compo checks would be
continuing. Mert did not call me back with an answer.
06-04-2006 • During this week, Melt left messages on my phone, but

never explained what the 6br meeting with a Doctor was for, or how long
my benefits would continue. She made iDsiDuations that I would have
my benefits diseontiDued in didn't have these scheduled examinations. I
replied to her when I would be available for these examinations, and that I
942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fa.:><: (208) 345-4700

Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com
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March 17, 2009

Page 20/4
was not refusing to take them, Mert also said, if I didn't see Dr Beaver, I
would have to pay them $2,000- $7,000,
I placed a call to St, Luke's on 6/12106 and they immediately backtracked, saying that
they would keep paying and would not be disputing Sharon's work comp claim,

1D the ensuing five ~ until the m mtiDg_11l13/06. this DfIlce SIDt ormceived
OWfSt1~ 2(}phtme~d~OtmallCM'IMS_~~ The
~~a~tI)Ur.NicolafofAPPImtiDg(4Il4lO6}.

As a result of our efforts. Sharon received medical treatment from Dr. Nicola without the
threatened interference from her employer, a PPI rating from Dr, Nicola, and a lump sum
settlement for PPD, future medicals. and all other disputed benefits.

From the date of the PPI rating until settlement, there were at least 50 more document,
phone, and email events. During Sharon's case, attorneys Breck Seiniger and Andrew
Marsh, and our work comp paralegals, advocated for her on issues including, medical
treatment, mileage and travel reimbursement, problems with and harassment by her dateof-injury employer, fe-employment issues, representation with the ICRD, and related
work comp issues, including of course obtaining a Jump sum settlement where the
employer disputed any disability beyond impairment.
For all of our efforts, and the many hours of work, and the value of our skill and
reputation, and the cost of our overhead, this office stands to have received a total of
$1746,01 in fees If the lump sum settlement agreement is approved by the Commission.
I would like to quote from Mr. Seiniger's correspondence to the Commission in a
previous case:
We believe that in attempting to prevent claimant's counsel from being
paid a fee on the whole value of the case, and limiting Seiniger Law
Offices, P.A,'s fees to "new money" the Commission is clearly acting
outside the scope of its authority and in violation of counsel's
constitutional rights:
In sua sponte reducing appellants' uncontested attorney fee agreements
without the suitable advance notice to all ofthe parties directly involved,
accomplished through properly enacted regulations, and without a
meaningful hearing, the Commission has acted in disregard of important
constitutional mandates. Specifically. the Commission'S current stance. as
Sejniger !IJltly ooints out, fails to compensate an attorney for acting solely
as a counselor and fails to recognize efforts that do not generate monetary
awards such as obtaining permission for medica! care or procuring an
impairment rating, Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made
suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients, thereby seriously
942 W. MYRTI..E STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fa.'C (208) 345-4700

Andrew@Seinigerl.aw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com

APPENDIX
Illustrative Example of Prior Application of "Available Funds" - IDAPA 17.02.08.233.01
- [XXXII] -

March 17, 2009
Page 3 oJ4
undermining the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new money"
provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters once
again contravening LC. § 72·508. The net result of the Commission's sua
sponte conduct is a deprivation of appellants' property rights under the fee
agreement without due process of law.
Curr V. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138 (Idaho,I993).

If you are aware of any authority to the contrary. Seiniger Law Offices,
P.A. would appreciate being made aware of it, because we would likely
decide to decline representation in cases where some, but not all, of the
benefits will "probably" be paid. It is unfortunate that after claimant's
counsel went to the expense in time and money to establish the foregoing
law, the Commission's representatives continue to try to limit claimant's
counsel's fees to "new money."
However, the fact is that it is never clear when a potential client comes to
see us what, if any, benefits the claimant will ultimately be paid, since
many defenses can be raised during the course of negotiations or litigation,
including apportionment for pre-existing conditions, denial of benefits for
failure to cooperate with treatment, etc. As but one eXatnple of the benefit
that a claimant obtains by retaining an attorney that may affect his rights,
communications between the surety or its attorneys and the claimant are
conducted through the claimant's attorney, and thus there is essentially no
chance that the claimant will make statements against interest or be
overborne upon by "nurse case managers" or other agents of the
Defendants who may regard an unrepresented party as less likely to know
their rights and insist upon them. Although such behavior may not be
widespread, and claimant '8 counsel does not accuse the Defendants, their
agents or attorneys of any such conduct in this or other cases, such
conduct certainly occurs.
Thus, the counsel given to a claimant by an attorney is not simply the
equivalent of a legal "Hallmark Card." It may be vital to protecting the
claimant'S rights, and certainly is essential to advising a claimant as to
what those rights are. For the Commission's representative to deny
attorneys fees on "uncontested" impairment ratings assigned after counsel
has been retained and is actively representing a claimant is equivalent to
either an implicit finding that such counsel was of no value in the
particular case (which they could never know with respect to an
uncontested attorney fee agreement) or an implicit finding that such
counsel is never of sufficient value to justify compensstion.
If the Commission would adopt a procedure whereby a claimant can come
to the Commission within some reasonable number of days before or after
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the claimant's initial meeting with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. and obtain a
guarantee that any benefits will be paid and that no defenses exist as to
those benefits, then Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., despite its constitutional
rights set forth above, \\-111 voluntarily agree in writing not to take an
attorney fee on those benefits. Of C<lurse, that will never happen, because
all defenses remain open to defendants in a workers compensation case as
a matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the
Commission.
We hope you will consider the above legal and factual issues in making your decision.
Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you.
Sincerely,
~//a....4Andrew Marsh

cc:

Racbael O'Bar, counsel for defendant
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
PO Box 113720
BoIse, 10113720-0041

(201)334-(,000· ¥AX(2OI)334-2321
1-8QO.9$O.2110

March 23, 2009
Andrew Matsh

Seini.ger Law Offices
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, ID 83702
RE: Sharon Cavanagh LSS
Your letter of March 17, 2009 10 Jennifer Poole bas been forwarded to me. The Idaho SupMlICI
Court's decision, Curr v. Curr, cited in your letter, was certainly pivotal. In response, the
IndUSlrial Commission promptly promulgated its cw:rent attorney fee rule, which bas
subsequently been cited several times by the Supreme Court in attorney fee appeals.
We are not now attempting 10 prevent proper attorney fees from being paid. We are rather trying
10 provide the oversight msndsted by statute and rule 10 determine the reasonableness of such
requested fees.

In JO'Iif letter you~ .ftlqUClll for lID impairmeatmtingbrt _ _ to . . . . . Woukt
yoaploueforwardaeopyottlllt~to*PooIe? If there was a prior medieaI
opinion of stability that prompted that correspondence, a copy of that would also be helpful.
Thank you.

~

Manager. Claims & Benefits

lEU lIAR 25 Z009
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SEINIGER
LAW OFFICES
l7tJfom..al Amtialil;n
ANDRFW C. MARSH

I...., ~_M"'-·

April 7, 2009
VIA FAX TO 334-2321

Jennifer Poole
Idaho Industrial Commission
Compensation Consultant
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83720-0041
RE:

Cavanagh vs. St. Lukes
Date of Injury:
4/0912006
IIC Case No.;
06-004060

Dear Ms. Poole:
&.~y_ Scott MoDoupl's . . cIated.3J23l09.~tmd~.«IPJ of...
oo~ to Dr. N'tOOla~a PfI·1'lltiBg{61151Oli).

Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you.

Sincerely,
~/./a-4-.

Andrew Maxsh
cc:

Rachael O'Bar, counsel for defendant

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
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L.AW OFFICES
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u.;.,O"""IV.-....._.DiJltitli(~

]UlJI!u.;.,1
M.usfI
_SmNIOEll
_

.DiJltitltI~

June 15, 2006
f1g u,£ MtIII
George Nicola, M.D.
West Idaho Orthopedics & Sports Medicine
206 East Elm
Caldwell, 10 83605

Re:

ClIJiImmt:
EmpItJyeJ':
DateufAccilktd:
DOB:

Slu:utm Cavanagh
Sf. Luke's Replttll Medical Ce1de
fMlfl9l2fJ(J6

Dear Doctor Nicola:
This office has been retained to represent your patient Sharon CaV8llll8h. who is

processing a claim for work related injuries. EDeiosed is a medieal. waiver uthorizIDg
yoa to give lIS medical iDformation about your patient ud our dieDt.

In an attempt to settle this case prior to hearing, we intend to submit to the
Defendant's representatives a copy of your medical evaluation and report. However. we
would like "u to proyide !bat report 0Dlx at such hie u you S!JducJe CUt Mt.
Cm'...... is stable aud !H be
a pen!Wlept impairment ratiIyr. Please do not
send a report if you do IIOt believe that the patient has a permanent impairment. In that
case please ask one of your staftto caI1 us and so advise.

ciY"

1.
2.
3.

Your findings.
Your diagnosis.
Your treaunen1.
4.
Your prognosis.
5.
An itemized statement of your fees to date.
6.
An estimate, if available, of future medical costs. and a statement of
whether it is more probable than not that such costs will be incurred.
7.
AD Iarpab_hadq.
8.
CompletioD of the endosed physical Umltatioll8 form showiDg the
restrictioll8 wbieh you utieipate my eHeat will have based upon her
942 W. MYlt1'U! STIt.EET
BOise, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
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•

•

pIlysieal impairmeat. A statemeat of physieal restr1ctioDl is eaeatial
for tile evaluatiou of disability by a voeatioual espert.

We would also like you to know that in this state au injured person may recover
damages not only for injuries to normal parts of the body, but also for injuries to those
parts of the body which were abnormal before the injury took place. If you found auy
pre-existing abnormalities or pre-existing conditioas such as degenerstive arthritis, it is
important for US to know whether these have beeu aagravated or inflamed in auy way.
Would you please send us a copy of your curriculum vitae so that we may put in
on file? Thank you very much.

Andrew C. Marsh
SElNIGER LAW OmCBS, P.A.
ACMljh

Enclosures:
• Medical Release
- LimItations Fonn

00: Claimant
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•
CIIIbtumt:

EmpItJyer:
Date (IfAccllknt:

•

SiitITOlI CfIIJtIIIlIIII
St. Luke's Rep1flll Me4ktII Ceillei'
tUI0912fJfJ6

DOB:
1)

Based upon your surgica1 findiDgs, was Ms. Cavanagh's condition and
resultant need for surgery a result of an acute injury consistent with the
reported mechanism ofinjury1 _ _ yes _ _110

2)

3)

Is Ms. Cavllllqh medically stable? _ _ yes _ _110. Ifnot,
what is the anticipated date 1bat she will be medically stable? _ __
What permanent physiatl impainnent would you assign as a result of the
claimed injuries?

Do you feel that Ms. Cavllllqh will be able to return to her date-ofinjury
job as Administrative Supervisor at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center?
_ _ yes _ _no
4)

Do you anticipate assigning any permanent limitatiom or restrictiOllS as a
direct result of Ms. Cavanagh's industtial injuries? If so, please specify.

--~

--

..

.....~~--

------------

S)

Does Ms. Cavanagh have any other medical condition that appropriately
limits her physical activities? Please specify.

6)

What is your prognosis regarding Ms. Cavllllqh's future medical care?

Date
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ANDERSON, JULIAN" HULL LIJ'
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 5'" Street, Suite 700
P. O. Box 7426
Boise, 10 83707·7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510
Alan 1<, Hull· ISB No.: 1568

mrt MaR -b P
i

II:

l~

RECEIVED

liiCUS I !<IAL COMMISSION

Attorneys for Defendant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SHARON C. CAVANAGH,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 06-004060

vs.
ST. LUKE'S REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Self-Insured Employer,
Defendant.

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT,
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT, AND ORDER OF
APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE

In consideration of the premises and promises and covenanta hereinafter
sat forth and subject to the CommiSSion's approval and Order of Discherge
pursuant thereto, the abova-antltled parties do stipulate and agree aa. follows.
On or about April 9, 2006, Sharon C. Cavenagh, hereinafter referred to as
Claimant. suffered an industrial eccldent arising out of and In the course of her
employment with St Luke's Regiona' MedICal Center, hereinafter referred to es
Self-Insured Employer.
On the date of the accident, the Employer was aelf-insured for liability
under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. The Employer,
Surety and the Industrial Commission of the Stete of Idaho received edequate and
timely notice of the eccident end injury.
At the time of seid ecoldent. Clalment was 60 years of age. divorced, and
had two children under the age of 18. aalmant worked part-time as a night Ihlft
nursing supervisor and earned $28.27 per hour. In the accident of April 9, 2006,
Claiment was walking through the Administration offICe when she tripped end fell
over a garbage can, ceusing injury including e frlCtUfe of her 'eft upper arm.
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE· 1
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Claimant sought Immediate medical treatment in the emergency department
of St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. Claimant's x-rays indicated comminuted
fracture of the proximal left humerus.
At the time of this injury. Claimant was recovering from a decompression
and rotator cuff repeir of her left shoulder and was working with restrictions of no
lifting. pushing or pulling more than 25 pounds and no overhead work with her
left arm. Claimant was waaring a sling on her left arm.
Claimant was avaluated in the emergency depertment of St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center on April 10. 2008 for complainte of left ahoulder psin.
left cheat pain and left hend pain. Claimant noted that she hed had a work
related injury after failing over a trash can and landing onto her left shouldar and
sustaining a proximal humerus fracture of tha left shoulder. Claimant hed been
placed in a shoulder Immobilizer. Claiment was treated and diagnosed with a
humerus fracture and a chest wall contusion.
Claimant was evaluated by Dr. George Nicola on April 12. 2006, in follow
up 01 her 'aft rotator cuff rapair. Claimant noted that sha had falten over a trash
can and had sustained a slightly comminuted fracture of har proximal humarus
with a fracture line that went up into the greater tuberOSity. None of them were
displaced significantly. On examination Claimant's neurovasculer exam was
intact. Claimant was plaCed in a sling and awathe. Claimant was asked to return
for x-rays in one wsek. Claimant was preacribed Dllaudid and Soma. Clelment
was taken off work through April 20, 2006. due to the fracture.
Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola on April' 20, 2006, for post-operatlve
follow-up. Claimant's shoulder was vary stiff and sora. Dr. Nicola opined that
sha WIS developing pain shoulder syndrome. Claimant's 'aft shoulder x-ray
looked good and the fracture was unchanged. Claimant was r.ferred to St.
Luke's Elks for a fairly vigorous course of physical therapy. Claiment was
provided a release to return to modified work in nursing servicas in a supervisory
position. Claimant was edvised not to drive.
Claimant sought traatment in the emergency dapartment of St.' Luke's
Regional Medical Canter on April 23. 2006. tor complalnta of 'eft elbow awelling
and redness. Clalment waa diagnosed with acute cellulitla of the left elbow along
With arm pain. Claimant was prescribed Levaquin and released to follow-up with
Dr. Nicola.
Claimant saw Dr. Nicola in follow-up on April 24. 2008 for evaluation of
har left elbow. It was noted that she had been aeen in the emargency room for
obvious cellulitis noted over the olecranon burse. most likely due to rubbing in the
sling. Claimant was on Levaquin. • Claimant's redneas and awelling were
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
OROER OF APPROVAL AND OISCHAFlGE • 2
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decr.ased with a less defined bord.r. Claimant was advised to r.maln out of the
sling and rest h.r elbow. Claimant was prescribed Tramadol. Claimant was kept
off work through April 28, 200fl.
Claimant participated in physical therapy for passive rang. of motion with
St. Luk.'s Idaho Elks Rehabilitation from April 26, 2008 through July 12. 2006.
On April 27. 2006, Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola for follow up. It was
noted that Claimant was making slow progress and wu doing batter. The plan
was to continue her with a range of motion and edema-control program. Claimant
was returned to modified duty of light assist with hat left arm, I••• , computer and
writing. Claimant was rastricted from uss of her lett shoulder. Use of hat lett
hand. arm and elbow w.re encouraged. Claimant was prescribed Vlcodln and
Zoffan. Claimant was edvis.d not to drlv••
Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola on May 11, 2006 in follow up. Claimant
hed made a remarkable improvement with hat hand/shoulder syndrom.. Dr.
Nicola was plaased with her progress.
Claimant was pr.scribed Norco.
Claimant's physical therapy was continued and ehe was ral.asad to modified duty
of light use of h.r I.tt hand, i .•.• comput.r and paperwork and no Ilttlng with h.r
I.tt arm.
On May 18, 2008, Claimant r.turned to Dr. Nicola for follow-up of her laft
shoulder. Claimant' a sting wes removed and ah. w.s aHowed full rang. of
motion. Claimant's pain appearad to be lasaaning, her motion wes better and her
str.ngth was improved. Claimant was advised to Increase her activity including
driving. Claimant complained that driving wa. difficult. It wss noted that
Claimant had some abdominal complaints Including a recant episode of
pancreatitis. Claimant was prescribed Zofran and Norco. Claimant was releasad
to modified duty of no lifting greater than two pounds with her left arm.
Claimant saw Dr. Nicola in follow up on May 2&. 2006, for stiffness in her
shoulder. Claimant noted her pain was decreased and her hand swelling and
stiffness wer. .xcellent. Claiment was referred for a fairly vigorous shoulder
rehabilitation cours.. Claimant was prescribed Norco. Claimant wa. out of her
shoulder sling and doing well. Claimant wu relaased to modified duty of no
overhead lifting and no littlng greater than 2& pounda with hat lett shoulder.
On June 8. 2006. Claimant raturned to Dr. Nicola for fOllow up. Claimant
continued to experiance aome decrsesed motion of the shoulder. but minimal
complaint.. Dr. Nicola opined that the shoulder would gradually loosen up.
Claimsnt was stili having problems with her hand including stiffness. Claimant
was able to flex her finders until she was approximately one Inch from the paim
and complained of some pain and swelling In the metecerpal Joints. Dr. Nicola
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RElEASE AND LUMP SUM seTTLEMENT, AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 3
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opined that some of her hand 8weiling was preexi8tlng arthritis, although she hed
some stiffnes. snd psln from the shoulderlhsnd syndrome. Dr. Nicola Indicated
that patiants who hIve some preexi8tlng erthritls tend to teke longe, to recover,
Claimant notad a new problem of right knee prepatellar bursitis. Claimant claimed
this was due to her work accident. Claimant and her sister claimad this first
sterted in May. Dr. Nicola stated, .....IS a rule. if tha patlant were to develop a
prepatellar bursitis from a direct fall. the ewelling should be immediate.· Dr.
Nicola advised Claimant to ice and wrap tha knee. He noted that she may need a
surgical debridement or aspiration. Dr. Nicola referred Claimant to Dr. Monte
Moore for II second opinion as her symptoms were "tanding to drag out .....
Claimant was prlScribed Norco. Claimant WIS refeased to retum to modified duty
of light use of her left upper extremity. no use of her 'eft hend above cheat
height. and no kneeling or squatting.
In a 'etter to Claimant's self-insured employer dated June 8. 2006. Dr.
Nicola provided the history obtained from Clalment that she had fellan on all
fours. striking both knees. Clalment stated that sha did not report the knee. but
that it began hurting immediately. Dr. Nicola edded. "Obviously, in spite of what
Ms. Cavenagh (sic:! state. in terms of her injury. a patient who does not complain
of knee pain or swelling, and there Is no history of knee pain for fiva weeks post
injury from an industrial Injury, suggests that the swelling may be from aomathing
other than the circumstances of her" fall of O4-OS'()6." Dr. Nicola added that
prepatellar bursitis can be due to a number of factors including a fall onto the
kne.., chronic kneeling on the knees. and sometim.. due to no cause
whatsoever. Dr. Nicola added that a flv..week lag between the time Claimant fell
and when the swelling was noted suggested that It was not due to the InjUly. Dr,
Nicola agreed that Dr. Wei.. at St. Luke's Occupational Health would be
appropriate for a second opinion evaluation In thla matter.
Claimant saw Dr. Nicola In follow up on June 22, 2006. Claimant noted
that sha WIS doing batter. Her hand range of motion WIS much improved. She
complained of some bruising of her shouldar, but it was not visible. Claimant
noted some continued stiffne.. mainly In abduction at approximately 46 degr....
External rotation was graduelly improving. Claimant notad that at that point het
knees wara not a problem. Claimant stated that her knees were aggravated when
she was kneeling, which Dr. Nicola edvised her not to do. Dr. Nicola added that
Claimant did not need any further treatment for her knees. Claimant was
complaining of soma radicular symptoms In ulnar distribution with a positive
Tine"s at the elbow. which he did not think was directly related to her industrial
condition. Dr. Nicola ordered Claimant an elbow pad. Claimant was prescribed
Lyrica. Dr. Nicola noted that Claimant was scheduled to ... Dr. Weiss.
Claimant was evaluatad by Michaef Weiss, M.D., on June 28, 2006, for
complaints of pain in he, ulnar hand, beginning at her elbow with weakn... in her
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL ANO DISCHARGE - 4
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hand. Claimant also notad aching and sharp pain in her shoulders with limited
range of motion. Claimant related the onset of this to her trip and fsll work injury
of 04119/06 IsiC) when she fractured her 'eft arm. Claimant noted her pain as
5110. C'aimant's left elbow lacked 10 dagrees of full extension. Cleimant's grip
strength was 55 pounds right and 18 pounds left, Claimant's sansation was
decreased to light touch in the ulnar distribution of the 'eft hand. Claimant was
diagnosed with status POst left rotator cuff taar and repair. status POst arm
fracture, complicated by catlulitis, and 'eft ulnar neuropathyI secondary to the arm
fracture. Claimant hed r..ponded well to Lyrica, which tanded to support a
neuropathic problem. Claimant w .. referred for electtodiagnostlc tasting of the
left upper extremity. Claimant w.. released to modified work with no lifting
above shoulder level. limited forceful gripping. no repetitive use of har left hand
and lifting or pushing limited to tan pounds.
Claimant underwent an electrodiagnostlc examinetion on July 12. 2006.
Claimant was diagnosed with possible subacute to chronic left ulna, axonal
neuropathy.
On July 19. 2006, Dr. W.... provided Claimant with work restriotiona
including that she could lift. push and pull up to 25 pounds with her 'eft arm.
In a July 20, 2006 letter to the salf-Insured employer, Dr. Nicola noted that
x-rays of Claiment·. left shoulder showed a well-healed fractur.. Th.te wa. no
avidenc. of Significant problem.. There was a aUght deformity noted of thl
greater tuberosity, but that was certainly reeaonable at thia time and should not
result in any restriction or disability. In review of Dr. Weiss' nerve conduction
study. it showed possible subacute to chronic left ulnar neuropathy, but appeared
to be chronic in nature. Dr. Nicola opined thet Claimant may have had a flare-up
in a preexisting ulnar neuropathy due to the sw..ling and edema In her upper
extremity, which should respond well to conservative treatment. CI"mant had
done fairly well on Lyrlca and her nerve conduction atudy showed a mild ulnar
neuropathy. Or. Nicola opined that this w .. greduelly Improving and continuing
to Improve. Or. Nicola did not recommend any treatment. Dr. Nicola disagreed
with Dr. W"ss' suggestion of modified work activity with lifting or pushing with
the left arm limited to 10 pounds. Dr. Nicola recommended Claimant do forceful
gripping and repatitlve use of the hand, as he thought the Initial problemS with the
hand were due to disuse and use should be encouraged as much .. posaible.
Claimant was provided a release to return to modified duty with lifting, pushing
and pulling up to 25 pounds with har teft arm.
Claimant returned to Dr. Wei.. on August 2. 2006. Claimant w .. doing
w,,1 on Lyrica. Claimant continued to have somewhat decre..ed range of motion.
Claimant's grip strangth hed improved with 50 pounds right 25 pounds left.
Sensation remained decreased to the left ulner hand. Dr. Wei.. noted that
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE· 5
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Claimant should do well on the membrane stabilizing medlcationa which w.re
racommendad for at least three montha. Claimant WII prater/bed Neurontin.
Claimant's light duty work WII continued and sha was asked to return In one
month for follow-up.
.
Claimant returned to Dr. Wei .. on August 16, 200fS. Claimant noted that
har shoulder was not both.ring her. Claimant noted that Neurontin cauted double
vision and difficulty during long work days. Claimant rated her pain as 411 0 from
her elbow distally. On examination Claimant's senaatlon wa. dlCr.ated in her
ulnar left hind. Dr. Weill noted, "Generally neuropathiee ara not conaldered
work related unle•• thl. Is related to her surgery In soma way." Dr. WeiSa
raferrad Claimant for a neurology consult and prncribed Claimant Nortriptyline.
Claimant'a work restrictions ware continued unchanged.
Claimant raturned to Dr. Nicola on August 17, 2006 in follow up. Claimant
was doing fairly wall with regard to her shoulder. It was noted that har main
problam wa. stiffna.. and pain in her hand. but her shouldar w.. doing wa"
without any significant difficulty. Ovarall. Dr. Nicola opined that he did not ...
any faason for changa In treetment. Or. Nicola opined that Claimant hed ,eeched
maximum medical Improvement of her 'houlder. Claimant wa, returned to
modified work of no h.avy lifting and no forcaful gripping with her left hand.
On October 5. 2006, Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola in follow up.
Claimant was doing fairly well. On examination Claimant', shoulder showed mild
limitation of motion, which Dr. Nicola attributed .. much to her rotator cuff repair
as to her shoulder fractura.
Claimant' a neurovascular axam w.. IntlCt.
Claimant's hind looked graat. Claimant wa. mls.lng a vary amall amount of full
flexion into tha palm but doing well. Claimant we. teking Amitriptyline and
Neuront;n. Ovarall, Claimant w •• continuing to improve.
In a .... detId Nov. . . 13, 2001, Dr, Neall . . . . . . . CIeInwIlhld
.re.chId IMXImwn IMCIIcaI ..,.,.., _ _ tor . . left tuMNe " . . . . • of
.~ 17. 2001. 'The _____ of ClUllMc'e
.... ~
twit ,...",.. to Nee
. Dr. ..... opIMd dIM
... a I~ .....
.J*8Oft ~. ,... with IO~ ..,..,... . . . . . . . . . . . ,..., QIIf
,
.... 2.•• ~ .,."... IniPllmwtt ,.... to . . AprIl I, 200e WOftt 1$rY.
Or.
..... diet 0IIrMnt WOUld not MId .., UIMr .......
for ...
l..-v. Dr. Nicola opined that Claimant did not hev. any permanent
restriction. related to tha work injury. Claiment WII restricted from heavy
overh..d lifting due to har rotator cuff te.r which wa. not work related.

won

On NowmW 14. 2001, ........................... '11111 . . .
......, October I, 2001 . . . to Dr.
........ CllllMnt'I ....... _ _ .,..
~ evaIunion. Dr. NIoaIe OOI.lIin_
CIIIIMM ........... ........
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..
m..icallmprovement from her left burRenIa fI'. . . of AprI I, 20M . . of ...
of her "eexieting ulnar~. ClalmlM" ~ a ' "
wI'Iola peraon Impalrmlnt rating.

8XacerDltion

Claimant's Pllt medical history iS81gnlflcant for a September 4,2003 right
rotator cuff repair by Dr. George Nicola, pancreatitis. lapneole. gastrojejunostomy.
pyloroplesty end multiple myeloma.
Claimant had a laft shoulder Injection by Or. GlOrge Nicola following the
onset of very significant impingement and pain on December 22, 2001.
Claimant underwent decompression and rotator cuff repair of her 'eft
shoulder by Dr. George Nicole on February 18.2008.
Pertinent m..lcal records are attached to the original Agreemant es exhibit
There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the
partles as to the degree, If any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need
for retraining, and the need for future medical benefItS.
Claimant and Defendant, desiring to settle the controversiaa in an amicable
way and to avoid the cost and delay of litigation of this claim and to buy their
pasce, have enterad into a settlement egreement which is acceptable to Claimant
and to the Defendant and which ia in the best interest of the partles. By rauon
of said settlement agreement, the parties hereto desire to Iettle and foraver
conclude Claimant's rights under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of
Idaho. "Claimant has offered to accept and the Defendant hal offered to pay the
sum of $3,099.00. aa itemized beloW, es full and flnal,attlement of Claimant's
claim. The partie, agrae that settlement 18 in tha best Interast, of the parties.
It ia stipuleted end agreed thet the aforementioned settlemant consideration
includes 10SI of wage earning capacity and non·medical factorl, should such
exist.
The parties waive any Findings of Fact and Conclusiona of Law es part of
the conaideratlon for thil agreement. Claimant hereto specifically and exprasa!y
waives all rights to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided for undar
Idaho Coda 172·718.
In processing this claim. medicel expanses in the amount of $10,289.00
have been incurred by Claimant and paid by the Self-Insured Employer aa Itemized
below:
~:
Americana - Occupational Health
Occupational Medicine and Rehabilitation
Orthopedic Fracture Clinic
SLMMC Occupational Health

•
•
•
•

138.00
608.10
637.20
64.00
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Subtotal

.I::i9JI;IIW:

'1.233.30

St. Luke's Meridian Medical Centar

83,456.05

daho 11($ Rehab Hospital

'1,948.33

~V'Ic'lTherapy:
MjlCelianeou~:

Boise City.xi. Inc.
Bolsa Radiology Group
Casa Management Services of Idaho
Sharon Cavanaugh - mileage
Sheron Cevanaugh - RX ralmbursement
Outpatient Pharmacy
SLMMC Pharmacy
Subtotal

TOTAL

• 8158.70
$
42.60
'1,717.44
•
152.24
$
73.10
•
24.80

13.lli:lt
'10,289.00

CLAIMANT UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES
NOT ITEMIZED AS BEING PAID ARE HER RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT UPON
APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT. THE DEFENDANT WILL HAVE NO FURTHER
RESPONSIBILITY FORMEDlCAL EXPENSES INCURRED TO DATE OR TO BE
INCURRED IN THE FUTURE, EXCEPT AS HEREIN BEFORE PROVIDED.
Claimant hereby attests that 11 she is not currantly on Medicare; end 21
does not expect to be on Medicare in 30 months and that she deas not have a
settfement of over '250,000.00 Claimant attests that naither she nor any of her
medical providers to her knowledge received Medicare benefits, 88 provided under
42 USC Section 1395, as a result of the work-related Injuries sustslned on AprIl
9. 2006. sat forth heraln.
The parties hereby recognize that errors running to the benefit of either
partY may have basn made in the benefit computatlons while procaeslng
Claimant's claim end heteby ag.... end atipulete that the lump sum conalcleretion
to be paid upon approval of thla agreement takes Into account an such errors
found in the accounting and further atipulete and agree that the Induatrial
Commission is empowered to make any necaasary corrections In the accounting
without the necessity of any party creating an eddendum. 10 long 88 the amount
to be paid Claimant, $3,099.00. is not sffected.
An itemization of Claimant's clalm as required by the Induatrial Commission
is as follOWS:

TotaI~ftlbfflty BwfJq.

4n1t04T166

(2 weeks & 5 days (I $1508.50/wkl

.1,380.20

'-t:!;T~
DtubI!Ity Btnef!tt.
hlbit"8"

4/28/06 to 5/13106
(2 weeks & 2 days ., various/wkl

•

120.12
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P~YIicllImptlnntnt•
·Ie~

(12.6 weeks 0 t310.7S/wlt)

$ ••814.37

Lump ~ COQIIdtratIo""
(lnCUCf.. any decreased wage earning
capacity. non-medical factors and

permanent partial disability, if anyl

$3,099.00

•••483.68

TOTAL:

~O Pr.vlous'y Paid:

•• 1,380.20
120.12
·$3,884.37
.3.011.00

PTO Previously Paid:

.$

PPI~P.b

AMOUNT DOl! CLAIMANT

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND

com:

am" to US

A.

Attpmey tees

B.

Costs taken prior to L$S

C.

Addltiona! enpmey fus to be
taken from LSS

O.

Additional
from L$S

COstl

-0-

$775.00

to be taken

g;"IZEP USl£'in0~ANDING MtlDICALS
011 deduct
eum aettJerMntI
emount due ClaImant

E.

iota!
Outstlrt:; Medica!.
o be deducted
lump eum IMIttIementi
of

-0-

amount due ClaImant
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.

·

NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT

2301.20

(Subuaet Line. C • D relating
to attorney fees, and Line E
relating
to
outstanding
medlcals,
from
the
tetal
amount due Claimant of this
LSS)
The panie. acknowledge that the nature and extent of this Injury,
temporary and pemanent penial disability, pefl"IIanent impairment, medical and
ralated expense. In this matter Bre uncertain and may be continuing or
progreuive and may exceed thou hereinbefore set forth, and the above shall not
limit the acope of thia agreement or the order of diachlll'ge entered by the
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and Include all rights and
claims to all permanent and temporary compensation and all medical and ralated
benefitS whether or not known, harein listed, discovered or contemplated by the
pertles, except ss herein before specifically provided.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and subject to the
approval of this entire agreement by the Induatrial Commiaaion of the Stata of
Idaho, the parties hereby stipulate and ag,ee that the Commlsaion may make and
anter its order approving a lump sum aattlarnant of this claim by the payment to
Claimant by the Self-Insured Employer of the sum of $3,099.00.
IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that this payment is in full and finel
settlement and release of all claims of Cleimant, har heirs and reprssantatives. for
compensation for total and partial temporary disability, medical IXpenSSS, both
past and future, speCific indemnity for permanant disability, decreesed wage
earning capacity, and any and all claims which Claimant and her heirs now have
or may have against tha Defendant in the future on account of such accident
snd/or injury under the worke,'. compensation laws of the State of Idaho.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED thet the Defandant Self-Insured
Employer shall pay the sum within thirty dey. following their receipt of the
approved snd conformed copy of thia antire agreement. Any Intereat allowable
under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the Stata of Idaho will not begin to
accrue until after the thirty-day period.
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED, STIPULATED AND AGREED that Claimant
undarstands that by antering into this agreement, and upon Ita approval by the
Industrial Commission. her compensation cisims and all rights In connection
therewith will be finally and forever settled and closed and that she will be foraver
berred from reopening this claim or otherwise claiming additional compensation
benefits on account of such accident andlor injury.
Claimant does agree to INDEMNIFY. DEFEND and HOLD ST. LUKE'S
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER HARMLESS from and against any further claim for
benefit which Is, Of may be, psyable pursuant to the Worker's Compensation
Laws of the State of Idaho and which arose out of or Is related to said accident
and/or Injury. This indemnification and hold harmless agreement shall In no way
inure to the benefit of any third perty or any party not herein specifically named.
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED AND AGREED by the pertle. that it ,. in their
beat intereats that this claim be finally and foraver settled, satisfied and
diacharged, and the perties hereto acknowledge that thi. agreement is mede at
Claimant's requeat snd is the acceptance of her offer by the Defendant. Claimant
acknowledges that she has carefully read this agreement and lagal Instrument In
Its entiraty, has received the edvlce of har counsei, and that she underatsnds Ita
contents and has signed the same knowing that this agreement forever concludee
and fully diaposes of any end all claims of any kind and character that sha has or
may have against the Defanctant on account of the above Injuries.
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SElNIGERLAW OFFICES. P.A.

By~~
A

meya for Claimant

ST. LUKE'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER.
SaIt·lnsured Employer

STATE OF IDAHO
"f2'
II.: ...
County of f2!?HH,,,;/>'( I

saya:

SHARON C. CAVANAGH, being first duly sworn upon oath. deposes and

That aha ia the Claimant in the abovtHntitied claim;
That aha has r..d the foregoing lump sum agreement, knows the contents
thereof and Mliavea tha ..me to be true to the Mat of her knowledge.

~>C1t~
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oapES OF APPftOYAL AND DISCHARGE
UPQN LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
The foregoing stlpulatlon, egreement end patltlon having duly end regularly
come before this Commlulon, and It appearing that the Interests of juStice and
tha best intaresta of tha partlH herein ara, and will be, served by approving thla
egreement granting the ordar of discharge as preyed for,
NOW, THEREFORE, the foregoing lltipulatlon and agreement shall be and
the same harein is approved, and further. the above-entltled proceedings are
hereby dismiued and concluded with prejudice.
L.
'
DATED this 10"" day of
.2009.

ot>lU.O,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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The Commission's Directly Conflicting Interpretations of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01

THIS CASE

"The net effect of these new regulatory provisions is
to continue to ensure that the attorney fees
approved in workers' compensation cases can 2.Ol¥.
be taken from funds which the attorney's efforts
"directly succeeded in obtaining on (his) client's
behalf." Intervener - Respondent's Brief at 20.
Emphasis supplied.
"Importantly, a charging lien can Q.!Jll: attach to
available funds where it is demonstrated that the
services of the attorney operated "primarily or
substantially" to secure the fund out of which the
attorney seeks to be paid. (See, IDAPA
17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.)" Decision in Kulm. AR 148.
Emphasis supplied.
Commission's Application of
17.02.08.033.01 to its own Hypothetical in
Kulm. AR 219-223
Analysis; step 1 • "Available

Eu.mIi:

(Claim accepted and benefits paid
before atty is retained) After atty is
retained, atty writes doctor and
requests impairment rating when
claimant is at max. med.
improvement. Doctor responds to
request, sends impairment rating,
which surety pays without dispute =
"available funds"
AnalYSis; Step 2· "Charging

um:

No attorneys fees "[a]ttorney's
actions probably would not be
sufficient to demonstrate that his
actions "substantially" secured the
PPI award, since attorney's efforts
were not, in the main, or essentially,
responsible for obtaining the PPI
award. There was no dispute that
claimant had suffered a significant
injury, and there was no dispute that
she was going to be entitled to some
type of an impairment rating. There
was no evidence that surety
contested the rating eventually given
by the treating physician." AR231-232. Em hasis su lied.

r

Rodriquez y. SEBS Corp. et. aI.
(See Appendix)

I
I
Commission's April 28, 2011 Interpretation of IDAPA
17.02.08.033 in unpublished opinion designated as
order

Facts: Attorney took funds from PPI while it was
being paid but PPI benefits were not primarily or
substantially to secured by the attorney.
IRodriguez Order at 1-3
Analysis; step 1· "Ayailable Funds"

The PPI benefits are "available funds".
Rodriguez Order at 4.
Analysis; step 2 • "Charging Lien"

A "charging lien" attached to the PPI benefits
because the fund of medical benefits was paid
(without dispute) after the atty met with the
claimant's doctor and translated. Rodriguez
Order at 5. Parenthetical supplied.
Contradictory Reasoning :

"A charging lien may be asserted by
counsel against claimant's right to any
compensation where it is shown that ..
the services of the attorney operated
"primarily or substantially to secure the
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be
paid." Rodriguez Order at 5.
. Yet the Commission concludes: "Counsel
i is entitled to a fee on medical benefits, but
I cannot obtain payment from that source.
I However, the chargjng lien that has been
L established by Counsel, attaches to
"available funds." in this case, the PPI
~ previously paid to Claimant, and
from which Counsel has previously taken
fees." Rodriguez Order at 5.
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What Attorney Fee Arrangements Are Allowed In A Workers
Compensation Case lUI! When Must You Seek Approval?
Scope of IDAPA
10.02.08.033.02
All requests for approval
are deemed requests for
"charging lien"
Required:
In any proposed lump
. sum settlement ...
Upon request of the
Commission

Regulation does not cover:
Situations where no
"Charging Lien" is sought
Situations where fees are
to be taken other than
from "available funds"

IDAPA "Fee Agreement"
Provisions
IDAPA 10.02.08.033.01.d.
"Fee agreemenf' means a
written document
evidencing an agreement
between a claimant and
counsel, in conformity with
Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct
(lRPC).topic
IDAPA 10.02.08.033.01.e.
"Reasonable" means that
an attorney's fees are
consistent with the fee
agreement and are to be
satisfied from available
funds, subject to the
element of
reasonableness contained
in IRPC 1.5

Attorneys fees in
non-contingent
arrangements
Approval of attorneys fees
incurred by Defendants

Questions Unanswered
By IDAPA 10.02.08.033
When do you need to
seek approval of fees on
benefits paid by
agreement other than on
approval of a lump sum
agreement?
What standards Apply To
Fees Where No Charging
Lien Is Sought?
Limitations on Right to Contract
Are non-contingent
arrangements permitted?
Hourly Fees?
Flat Fees?
Are Fee Agreements
Enforceable or Just a
Limitation on an Equitable
Right to Compensation?
Regulation contemplates
Contracts, not just
equitable relief
Lawyers are apparently
required to have a written
fee agreement
Relationship Between
Contract And Equttable
Principals
Are Equitable Principles A
Limitation On The
Contract Or An Alternative
Remedy?
Can A Fee Greater Than
Contract Rate Be Ordered
By The Commission On
Equitable Grounds?
What aspect of IDAPA
10.02.08.033 either
requires or prohibits
requests for approval of
fees other than with
respect to a charging lien?
Is there are right to collect
fees without approval?

APPENDIX
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

SAMUEL RODRIGUEZ,

)
)

)

Claimant,

)
)
)

v.

)
)
)
)

SEBS CORPORATION INC.,
Employer,

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

IC 2006-503175

ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES

FI LED

APR 28 2011
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

)

This matter came before the Industrial Commission pursuant to the Commission's
February 25, 2011, Order on Reconsideration, and pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(b), for
the purpose of entertaining evidence and argument of Counsel in support of his claim for an
award of attorney's fees in the amount of $20,000.00 on an approved Jump sum settlement. This
Order supersedes the Commission's December 13, 2010, Order Approving In Part Modified
Lump Sum Agreement, and the January 19,2011, Order Releasing Final Proceeds to the extent
those orders treat the issue of Counsel's entitlement to attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth
below, we approve Counsel's request for attorney's fees on the lump sum settlement.
On or about January 23, 2006, Claimant suffered a severe urethral injury as the result of a

benefits were paid On or about

compensable accident/injury.

February 16, 2006, Claimant retained the services of Breck Barton, Counsel herein. Claimant

ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES - 1
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eventually underwent urethral reconstruction surgery performed by Dr. Taylor. This surgery was
not successful. Claimant continued to have pain and difficulty urinating. As well, he developed

g;fU;!~~J;J

Dr. TaylotdeclamdClmmant ll'Mlically stable. and entitled to a
opklion. and. &egan pay.Jn.ent of

At 2006 rates, a 34% impairment rating equates to $52,827.50. Over
As
well, he took costs in the amount of $3,000.00.

Dr. Taylor rendered his opinion on Claimant's
impairment at the request of Surety. Surety accepted Dr. Taylor's opinion, and commenced the
payment of the rating. Although Counsel requested a rating from Dr. Taylor, that request was
not made until after Dr. Taylor had already rated Claimant.
Shortly after Surety commenced the payment of the PPI rating, Claimant and Counsel
met with Dr. Taylor. Claimant does not speak English. Counsel is fluent in Spanish. Claimant
and Counsel explained to Dr. Taylor that Claimant continued to have severe urethral discomfort,
incontinence and testicular pain.

Dr. Taylor was evidently impressed enough with these

complaints, which he had apparently not fully comprehended, that he arranged for additional
medical consultation/treatment for Claimant, notwithstanding that he had only recently declared
Claimant medically stable. Claimant eventually underwent further surgical therapy, to include
treatment by a noted regional expert on urethral reconstruction. Claimant obtained an excellent
surgical result. It is clear that because of Counsel's efforts in meeting with Claimant and Dr.
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Taylor, Claimant received additional successful medical therapy valued in excess of
$125,000.00, along with attendant TID and travel benefits. In total, Counsel was primarily or
substantially responsible for securing additional medical, travel and TID benefits valued at
$139,570.94.

By far, the largest portion of these additional benefits was paid directly to

Claimant's medical providers by Surety, after Surety agreed to provide the prospective care that
had been recommended by Dr. Taylor and the experts with whom he consUlted.
These facts set up an interesting conundrum. Counsel took a $10,341.41 attorney fee on
a PPI award which he did not "primarily or substantially" secure, yet he is unable to take a fee on
the over $125,000.00 of medical benefits he secured for Claimant following Dr. Taylor's
premature pronouncement of Claimant's medical stability in September 2006. Although Counsel
was primarily and/or substantially responsible for securing this treatment, there is no way for
Counsel to obtain payment following Surety's agreement to provide the requested care: Payment
for services goes directly to the providers who can, perhaps, be forgiven for insisting that they
receive full payment for the services that they intend to provide, without deduction by
Claimant's Counsel for the services that he provided in obtaining Surety's agreement to provide

to be paid, However, closer scrutiny of the provisions of the applicable regulation reveals that
under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it was appropriate for Counsel to take a fee against
the non-disputed PPI award, in order that Counsel should obtain compensation for the service he
rendered in connection with the prospective medical care eventually authorized by Surety.
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.80 defines available funds as follows:
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall
not include any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's
agreement to retain the attorney.
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Available funds do not include, inter'alia, workers' compensation benefits that
were not disputed prior to Counsel's retention, Here, Counsel was retained on February 16,
2006. At that point, Claimant was still receiving medical treatment and was stiU in a period of

17ebmary 16, 2006.

Of course, Claimant did become medically stable in September 2006, at least

per Dr. Taylor, and Surety did accept, without dispute, the impairment rating given by Dr.
Taylor.

was

."llI''''''-y,

That issue had not yet come into existence. Tberefm'e,. we

conclude that the PPI award .of$S2.827~SO
applicable regulation.
Next, we must ascertain whether Counsel's charging lien can attach to those available
funds in order to satisfy Counsel's claim for attorneys fees. Like the term "available funds," the

term "charging lien" is a term of art, and is defined at IDAP A 17.02.0S.033.01.c. as follows:

"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the
Workers' Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to
demonstrate that:
1.

There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable
principles;
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n.

The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure
the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;

iii.

It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds
rather than from the client;

iv.

The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the
case through which the fund was raised; and

v.

There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and
application of the charging lien.

For purposes of the instant inquiry, attention is first directed to the provisions of subpart
(c)(ii). A charging lien may be asserted by counsel against claimant's right to any compensation

where it is shown that . . . the services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially to
secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid." Assuredly. Counsel's actions were
initially, and in the main, responsible for securing over $125,000.00 in medical benefits for his
client See, Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, IC 2006-012770 (filed May 20, 2010). As well,
Counsel certainly "seeks" to be paid out of the medical benefits he obtained for Claimant. The
problem, of course, is that Counsel can "seek" payment from these benefits, yet never obtain a
nickeL Again, those benefits were paid directly by Surety to Claimant's medical providers who,
themselves, have an interest in being paid.

mtitled to '\1

on medicallJeneftts" but
~tithedby

and

provisions of

I I J ,.. . . ,..

attorney's fee,
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We

to pomt out that

PPI award, hil claimwoultibetienied. Although the PPI award does
constitute "available funds," Counsel did nothing to ''primarily or substantially" to secure that
award. Therefore, if the only issue before us was Counsel's entitlement to a fee on that award,
we would be constrained to deny Counsel's claim. HOYlfWer... here. Counsel "'$eeks'*i) bepaiti

In accordance with the forgoing. the fees that Counsel has previously taken against the
PPI award, in the amount of $10,341.41, along with previously taken costs in the amount of
$3,000.00, are approved.

As well, Counsel's request for fees in the amount of $8,65859,

proposed to be taken against lump sum consideration of $24,000.00, is likewise approved, as are
costs ofS928.42. We note that Counsel's efforts were primarily andlor substantially responsible
for securing benefits with a value of $139,570.94. At the allowed 25% rate, Counsel is actually
entitled to an award of $37,892.74. However, his past and current fees total only $20,000.00,
well within the amount of the allowed charging lien.

lIlt
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In accordance with the foregoing. the sum of $9,587.01, which was the subject of the
Commission's January 19,2011, Order Releasing Final Proceeds, is hereby released to Counsel,

ill accordance with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

~L;\
DATEDthiS~dayof
_ _'-~-+F_ _ _ _ _,2011.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

'"

~~~~

~~

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

R.D. ~ynard, Co~sionet

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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~r; f

,

I hereby certify that on the
day of
2011 a true and correct copy of
the Notice of Video Conference on Attorney's F es was served by regular Umted States upon
the following:
BRECK H BARTON
POBOX 100
REXBURG ID 83440
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